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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over this matter lies within §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
Issues: 
All of Bonnie Harris5 claims on appeal may be divided into two issues: 
1. Whether or not the trial court denied Bonnie a fair trial and opportunity to 
be heard (Bonnie claims denial of due process and equal protection. *); and 
2. Whether or not the trial court's Findings of Fact are "clearly erroneous" 
as to the particular allegations of error Bonnie has raised on appeal (Bonnie claims error 
of the trial court in seven (7) other particulars.2) 
Standards for Review: 
1. Questions challenging Constitutional propriety of trial court conduct must 
meet two requirements: 
a. The question of constitutional objection must be raised before the 
trial court, preserving a specific issue for review3; and 
b. Properly preserved Constitutional questions are reviewed "for 
correctness."4 
2. Findings of Fact of a trial court are not reversed unless "clearly 
erroneous."5 
1
 Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant Bonnie Harris, p 7. 
2
 Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant Bonnie Harris, Issues 1 and 3-8, pp 6-10. 
3
 Bair v. Axiom, 20 P.3d 388, 395 (Utah, 2001). 
4
 Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 176 (Utah App. 2000). 
3 
Citation to Record Showing Preservation of Issue Presented for Review: 
Bonnie's Brief on Appeal does not meet the requirements of Rule 24(a)(5)(A) 
and (B), URAppP. Bonnie's Brief makes no citation to the record showing that any 
Constitutional claim or issue was preserved in the trial court nor is there any statement 
of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES 
INTERPRETATION OF WHICH IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Bonnie's Brief on Appeal does not meet the requirements of Rule 24(a)(6). 
Bonnie's Brief fails to recite any Constitutional provisions or Statutes of central 
importance. Page ten (10) of Bonnie's Brief carries a reference phrase, "Reproduced in 
Addendum." However no Constitutional provisions or Statutes are reproduced in the 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This action was first filed in 1995, almost six (6) years ago. The sole issue is 
division of assets approximating one million dollars. 
This is a second marriage domestic case. No children were born and none were 
ever expected. The parties separated in 1995. The matter was bifurcated and a Decree 
of Divorce was granted on January 26, 1999. Both parties, Craig Harris ("Craig") and 
Bonnie Harris ("Bonnie") filed appeals. Both appeals, case numbers 2000037 and 
2000038, were consolidated into 2000037-CA. 
5
 Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 177 (Utah App. 2000). 
4 
During the course of the matter, the trial court set a number of discovery 
deadlines with which Bonnie did not comply. However, the trial court did not impose 
sanctions against Bonnie but granted her additional time—plus more. 
The trial court's Order as to division of property was filed on November 29, 
1999.6 That should have concluded the matter but Bonnie appealed. Craig filed a Rule 
59 Motion for clarification of the Order that had been prepared by Bonnie's counsel. In 
response to Craig's Rule 59 Motion, on April 4, 2000, the trial court filed Amended 
Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law J giving particular emphasis 
to and significantly expanding its reasons for denial of alimony to Bonnie Harris 
("Bonnie"). 
However, throughout Bonnie's Brief and her appeal, Bonnie repeatedly 
refers to the Orders of the trial court that were issued on November 29, 1999. Bonnie 
has continued to pursue her original 1999 appeal just as if the April 4, 2000 "Amended" 
Order was never issued. 
Bonnie's continuing appeal challenges all facets of proceedings before the trial 
court, including claims of violation of due process and equal protection. Thus the 
parties are again before the Court of Appeals on all issues. 
Course of Proceedings: 
The couple separated when Bonnie filed for a Protective Order and Craig filed for 
divorce in 1995. The parties Stipulated on the record and an Order of Temporary 
6
 Copy of the Court's November 29, 1999 Order is included in the Addendum. 
7
 Record, 770 - Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
5 
Support was issued. Bonnie obtained new counsel, seeking to have her Stipulation 
and the Order of Temporary Support set aside. Bonnie's Motion was denied. 
In 1998, Bonnie requested the appointment of the CPA firm of 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates ("Norman/Loebbecke") for accounting and valuation of 
all assets, including separate and marital assets. An Order was entered that appointed 
Norman/Loebbecke and that all information was to be provided by each party to 
Norman/Loebbecke. Bonnie failed to provide any information or respond to Discovery. 
Craig obtained an Order to Show Cause. Bonnie was Ordered to provide all 
information to Norman/Loebbecke within ten (10) days and the Divorce was granted. 
Identification and division of assets was reserved for later hearing. 
Fourteen (14) days later Bonnie again changed counsel and filed Objections to 
Craig's proposed Order. In 1998, trial Judges changed from Judge Anthony W. 
Schofield to Judge Ray M. Harding Jr. The new trial Judge set aside the discovery 
deadline Order, directing that Bonnie must provide all information to 
Norman/Loebbecke no later than close of business on October 29, 1998. That Decree of 
Divorce was entered as effective on October 19, 1998. 
Bonnie did not respond to outstanding Discovery and no information was 
provided to Norman/Loebbecke. 
On June 1, 1999, Bonnie filed a Motion for Relief from the Discovery Order. Craig 
filed an objection. Hearing on that Motion was held on July 12, 1999 and the trial court 
set aside its prior Order, requiring that Bonnie provide information to 
Norman/Loebbecke no later than "close of business on July 26, 1999." 
6 
Note: A separate post-judgment issue exists between the parties on appeal under 
Utah Court of Appeals case number 20010341-CA. The new trial Judge granted 
Bonnie's Motion to Strike Craig's accounting and post judgment claim that Bonnie 
surreptitiously and by design obtained $67,897.00 in excess of that granted to her by the 
trial court. The Docketing Statement has been submitted on that matter but the case 
has yet to be scheduled for briefs on appeal. 
Disposition in the Court Below: 
Divorce was granted and property was divided. Bonnie appealed all issues, 
including new issues of violation of the Constitution. 
Craig appealed the wording of the trial court's order that had been prepared by 
Bonnie's counsel. At the same time, Craig brought that specific question again before 
the trial court under Rule 59 for clarification. Subsequently, the trial court accepted the 
merits of Craig's Rule 59 Motion, issuing "Amended" findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and an order dated April 4, 2000. Given that amendment, Craig had no other reason 
to appeal but Bonnie has continued to pursue her appeal, primarily still claiming error 
under the November 29, 1999 orders that the trial judge replaced on April 4, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This is a second marriage for both parties. No children were born of this 
marriage and none were ever expected.8 The parties separated in 1995 some time before 
Record, 13, Admitted in Answer, paragraph 3. 
7 
this action was commenced.9 During that time, Mr. Charles A. Schultz, Esq. represented 
Bonnie. 
2. Before the marriage, Craig owned a home in Pleasant Grove, 
investments/personal property, and AID Equipment Company (a mechanical 
engineering and specialized equipment fabrication business). Craig had two sons (Troy 
and Scott). Both sons testified at trial. They had both worked with their dad and have 
continued to work in the business with their dad for a number of years.10 Court 
appointed CPA testimony at trial was that Craig's premarital asset value was between 
$191,800.00 to $241,800.00.n 
3. Bonnie's premarital assets claimed value was $65,000.00.12 
4. The CPA firm total Net Value of the combined estates and marital assets 
as of the court's ordered date of division, being the date of divorce, was $973,202.00.13 
5. Bonnie claimed more and the trial court findings were that Craig's 
premarital assets were $141,800.0014 and that the value of Bonnie's premarital assets, 
minus certain acknowledged reductions, was $78,804.00.15 
6. Each party retaining their premarital values, the trial court findings were 
that the "Net marital asset value subject to equal division" was $725,915.00.16 
9
 Record, 1-3 
10
 Record, Transcript, 330 (Scott), 399 (Troy). 
11
 Record, Norman/Lobbecke Associates, CPA's, "Plaintiffs Exibit 2," page 1. 
12
 Record, Norman/Lobbecke Associates, CPA's, "Plaintiffs Exibit 2," page 2. 
13
 Record, Norman/Lobbecke Associates, CPA's, "Plaintiffs Exibit 2," page 3. 
14
 Record, 630 — Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 630, paragraph 1. 
See also Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record, 770. 
8 
7. The trial court then awarded all non-business-related real property and 
some personal property to Bonnie. The trial court determined that the total value 
distributed to Bonnie, including premarital assets, would be $441,761.50, 
8. The trial court then awarded the business-related property and some 
personal property to Craig. The trial court determined that the total value distributed to 
1 O 
Craig, including premarital assets, would be $572,729.00. 
Pretrial Procedures: 
9. On October 10, 199719, appearing before court with her second counsel, 
Mr. Patton, Bonnie stipulated to temporary support and on October 30, 1997, Judge 
Schofield, then presiding, entered a temporary support Order. 
10. Bonnie then obtained new counsel, Ms. Hiller-Polster, moving that Judge 
Schofield set aside both her Stipulation and the Court's temporary support Order}1 
11. Bonnie claimed that she had suffered an "anxiety attack" at the hearing22 
and that she also suffered from a disabling heart condition, requiring additional support 
15
 Record, 630 — Supplementary Findings p. 2, para 4, and Amended Supplementary documents, 
Record, 770. 
16
 Record, 630 — Supplementary Findings, p 3, para 7, and Amended Supplementary Findings, 
Record, 770. 
17
 Record, 630 — Supplementary Findings, p 4, para 7, and Amended Supplementary Findings, 
Record, 770. 
Record, 630 — Supplementary Findings, p 4, para 8, and Amended Supplementary Findings, 
Record, 770. 
19
 Record, 80 - Minute Entry. 
20
 Record, 94. 
21
 Record, 98. 
22
 Record, 131, paragraph 2. 
9 
due to her illness and inability to work or support herself.23 Hearing on that issue came 
again before Judge Schofield on December 3, 1997.24 
12. After hearing that matter and by Order on January 26, 1998, Judge 
Schofield denied Bonnie's Motion.25 At trial before Judge Harding almost two years 
later, the trial court's Findings were that,26 
The Respondent [Bonnie] testified that for the past several years, 
she had no physical or mental disability which prevented her from being 
gainfully employed. 
13. While before Judge Schofield, Bonnie specifically requested the trial 
court's appointment of the CPA firm of Norman/Loebbecke Associates for accounting 
and valuation of all marital assets. 
14. A written Stipulation as to Accounting and Determination of Values to 
the appointment of Norman/Loebbecke Associates was signed by the parties and 
filed.27 
15. Having received the parties' Stipulation, Judge Schofield signed the 
Order Re: The Accounting and Determination of Values?* That Order directed that, 
All questions and disputes related to accounting and determination of 
all property, both real and personal, values shall be submitted to the firm 
of Norman/Loebbecke Associates. 
23
 Record, 107, paragraphs 36-44. 
24
 Record, 265 - Ruling. 
25
 Record —p 269-Order 
26
 Record, 766 — Supplementary Findings, p 3, para 7, and Amended Supplementary Findings, 
Record, 770., last sentence of paragraph 10(b) 
27
 Record, 271 - Stipulation as to Accounting and Determination of Values. 
28
 Record, 273. 
10 
Each of the parties shall provide Norman. I .oebbecke Associates v.-tb 
die lacts winch each believes is material to the identification of proper!) 
land] the underh ing facts claimed as to such, property. Both parties shall 
coop—He in pro\iding Norman/I oebbecke Associates with access 
to any ami .dj informal* -- v.-hic1* '•:-:-1 :~" - - ^ <n *-MUE^ f 
.,.! nere by any dispute as to an\ ^ d matter* the question .^ 
be brought before the Court by nu\ ui'motion |cr an appropriate order 
Plaintiff ^at1 ngagc and pay the costs oi tne , ; \ : u ' oi 
Norman/! oebbecke Associates, " fhe cost of such sen ices may be paid 
T the business account and shall be considered h\ the Court and 
H or allocated in whole or in part euualh between both parties as 
may determine appropriate n> iL iina. ordei iciree. 
coriMu^ how such costs relate to all other issues. 
Y ":«. . IM. Ma- th~r transferred (oi further proceedings I mi Indue 
Anthom •- vi--.iv. I 11.iiiding \\\3 
17. The i f A linn oi iNorman/Loebbecke was retained '^ ~raig as Ordered. 
But Bonnie failed to provide any information. 
18. Bonnie also lailul 'n n.ih*. ,'m icspiHise In « iMandmi' l>isu>ven that 
] . , .. more than a year before. 
19. On March 17, 1998, a formal communication as to unanswered discovery 
requests was sent to Bonnie's counsel .. , . • ,l> 
There have been several M;-... lications between ^nr oltkes in regard 
to the outstanding discover) recehed b\ -.on; Jieni more than one year 
ago and present discovery pas! , v . : he last ^mmanication we received 
was thai die discover < .spouses .\uujd K reeivcd hefotv Mrs Harris 
left for her trip to Italy. 
lniormanon received na\ Miat Mr. fi.iini1. left toi itnh mote than two 
weeks j"" 
29
 Record, 259 - Minute Entry. 
30
 Record, 277 - Letter to Bonnie's counsel dated March 1 * l^>8. 
11 
Please advise your client that if responses are not received by this 
office on or prior to 5:00 p.m. on Friday, March 20, 1998 this office will be 
required to bring the issue again before the Court for an appropriate order 
and sanctions as the Court may determine. 
20. Still, nothing was received. Nothing was received by either Craig, Craig's 
counsel or by the firm of Norman/Loebbecke. A number of months passed. Still, 
nothing was received. 
21. Consequently, on September 8, 1998, Craig filed a Verified Motion for an 
Order to Show Cause, to compel Bonnie to provide information to Norman/Loebbecke 
as previously stipulated and ordered.31 Included in Craig's Motion was also a request 
that the matter be bifurcated, granting the divorce. The trial court scheduled hearing on 
that Motion for October 19, 1998. 
22. A minute entry dated October 19, 1998, reflects that a Mr. Lee Rudd 
appeared as counsel for Bonnie at that hearing. The trial court's Minutes on the Order 
to Show Cause, state that, 
[The] Court grants [Craig's] motion to bifurcate and orders information 
to be provided to the account [accountant, Norman/Lobbecke, CPA's] 
within 10 days by Bonnie Harris. Mr. Martin [Craig's counsel] is to 
prepare the order. 
23. Craig's counsel prepared a proposed order as directed. 
24. But Bonnie then filed her Objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Decree on November 2, 1998. 
31
 Record, 293. 
32
 Record, 316. 
33
 Record, 319. 
12 
''» Bunni'i: then ayam changed legal counsel. Mr. J Grant Moody, filed his 
Appearance of Counsel on December 15. 1998." 
• 26 It was then Hoiinie s new iuinni.1 l.ii Month \\\\w pieparnl three 
iilueiiiiiiiiil , I ih I I nil -1 signature in accordance with the court's rulings 
Bonnie's counsel prepared the Order on <>./i*- t<> SJt< . Cause?5 the Findings *r+ 
and Conclusions of La w as to Decree of Di.orcc anu r^ , h je W / Uvoiw 
Minnie's new counsel were 
i)iigi *IHJ*'I * Girding on January 26, 1999. 
28. The Decree of Divorce granted the divorce with a™ • irective 
October 19., 1998, leaving the issin «ul dispwsitioi I pio|u ilv reserved lur further 
hca i iny.38 
• M i " i i v 29. Since the effective date was earlier i\ ^ 'he propertv ^^ributi-n 
by the trial court, the trial judge made specific inqun ;• -.. ." 
Questions I o: Mr. Brad I ownsend, NoriTian/Lobbecke, CPA's (court appointed) 
Judge: I have one question •<•? ^ « *'«• ••furcaicd divorce that I 
granted in January was effeeiive October ol 98. IN there any 
significant differences in the values between < Mober and 
January? 
A Probably not. We, we didn t complcu- •• J* anahsis as of 
October but it was really fairly close to what we saw n January. 
The loans were paid down some between October a u\ January 
34
 Record, 339. 
35
 Record, 360 
36
 Record, 363 
37
 Record, 365. 
38
 Record, 365. 
39
 Record, 1281 Transcript pp 540-541. 
13 
on the commercial building. Cars lose their value. But not, not a 
hugely significant difference I wouldn't imagine. 
30. Also on January 26, 1999, at Bonnie's new counsel's request, the trial 
court judge signed and issued an Order on Order to Show Cause40 that had been 
directed against Bonnie, again requiring cooperation in discovery and that she provide 
documents to the CPA firm. That Order specifically directed that, 
Defendant, Bonnie Harris, shall provide any and all information she 
may wish to Norman/Loebbecke Associates, CPA's regarding her position 
with respect to the assets of the marital estate. All such information shall 
be provided to Norman/Loebbecke Associates to arrive at such offices no 
later than close of Business on October 29, 1998, being ten (10) days from 
the date of hearing hereon. Any information received by 
Norman/Loebbecke from Defendant after such date and time shall be 
excluded from trial and shall not be considered by Norman/Loebbecke in 
compiling its report in preparation for trial. 
Reasonable attorney fees and costs are granted to Plaintiff for bringing 
this Order to Show Cause. Plaintiffs counsel shall submit its affidavit in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Procedure. 
Temporary orders previously issued shall remain in effect in so far as 
such are not in conflict herewith and both parties are enjoined from 
disposing or encumbering marital assets as previously ordered by the 
Court. 
31. Still, nothing was received. Bonnie made no response to Discovery and 
Bonnie provided no information to the CPA firm of Norman/Loebbecke as ordered. 
Another number of months passed by. Still, nothing. 
40
 Record, 360. 
14 
\iiulavit from the firm of Norman/Loebbecke dated f cbruar\ 3. 1999 
signet! b) Brad nvnsend, CPA, was filed with the trial court on <. bruar- r "K 
stating that \w ii.i*. ; u c \ a l a copy ol the (IKILT, 
MUIU, ; ,uagc Ka\ .\i. iiuiuing, *-• lanuarx 'J iW'pursuan 
an order u> show cause hearing held -n * \\* \KT 19, 1*»S !u. * !.. 
instructed Bonnie Harris !o "fcpn>\ide un and all information that she i;u\ 
wish io ^ -inmn Loebbeeke Associates, < !\A" \ regarding her position 
respi.,j h» the assets of the marital estate. All such information shall 
be provided to Norman-Loebbeeke Associates to arrive at such offices no 
' than close of business on October 29, 1998, being ten (10) days from 
the date of hearing hereon Any information recehed 
Norman/Loebbecke from Defendant alter ^u^i; diiu tnd linn, shah *••*. 
excluded from trial and shall not be considered by Norman/I.oebbecke in 
compiling its report in preparation for trial." 
As of the close os i;aMhc-. on October 29, 1998, neither myself* nor 
the offices of Norman/Loebbecke Associates, nor anyone in the offices of 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates had received any information whatsoever 
from Bonnie Harris or her counsel regarding her position will- respect to 
the assets of the martial estate. 
3 3 . Af te r a S c h e d u l i n g C o n f e r e n c e on r 
for Iruil nn i «iii r,l lil'i I  M><l KH 
34. After that, having failed to meet the trial court's discovery Order, on June 
1, 1999, Bonnie filed a Motion ^ #";/t / t><>hi iJrih, * itrMu< 
I | > -CIMI: d ^ a i the 
January 26, 1999 Order that prohibited i ia "from using" the C P \ nr:i f 
Norman/Loebbecke from considering anv information given to thu uetenaant 
[Bonnie] subsequent , • • > *X. 
Record, 403. 
15 
35. On June 14, 1999, Craig filed his Objection42 that included a copy of the 
Affidavit of Brad Townsend, CPA, Norman/Loebbecke Associates.43 
36. Mr. Townsend's Affidavit44 stated that, 
Since February 20, 1998 [the date of the trial court's order] I have 
received information regarding the assets of the marital estate from Mr. 
Harris. 
Part of the information provided to me by Mr. Harris was information 
which Mr. Harris and his attorney informed me was information provided 
to them by Bonnie Harris ("Ms. Harris") in response to Mr. Harris' 
interrogatories. The information I received and which I was informed came 
from Ms. Harris, was merely the same information previously provided to 
me by Mr. Harris. 
Since February 20, 1998, the date of the court order, I have received no 
information regarding the assets of the marital estate directly from Ms. 
Harris or her counsel. 
On August 25, 1998 I received a phone call from Margo Hiller-Polster 
("Ms. Hiller-Polster"), attorney for Ms. Harris, inquiring about the status 
of the case. I informed her that we had received a great deal of information 
from Mr. Harris but had not yet received any information directly from Ms. 
Harris regarding her position with respect to the assets of the marital 
estate. 
I followed up our phone conversation of August 25, 1998 with a letter 
addressed to Ms. Hiller-Polster dated September 1, 1998. In this letter I 
again informed Ms. Hiller-Polster that we had not received any information 
whatsoever from Ms. Harris regarding her position with respect to the 
assets of the marital estate. I emphasized to Ms. Hiller-Polster that, as 
stated in the Court's order, it was each party's responsibility to provide 
me with information in support of their respective positions relating to the 
value of the assets in the marital estate. I also stated that I would be 
willing to meet with Ms. Hiller-Polster and her client as a convenient time 
to discuss the issues ordered by the court. 
Record, 452. 
Record, 434. 
Record, 434, See also 367. 
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... ^ ^ ou. L.K lane, pas-; of September, I called M . ilillci-Polstci *.o 
determine whether Ms 1 iarn > had any intention of responding i m\ 'cun 
dated September 1. 1W8 b\ providing me with informal ion regarding die 
lal estak; \K I hiler-Polster informed me that she would not K 
providing me with any information based on the fact that an order to slm* 
cause was scheduled for October 19 [, 1998, being the hearing on c 
Motion, to bifurcate under which a divorce was granted.] 
u,. *^*Jig received the "'trial court's Order that Bonnie was to provide il1 
information to Mr. Townsend CP A — ~r before the October !9, 1998 discovery on 
date, . utidavit dated •- \\ IIMII"! advi'^d 
making nis repoi t to the court,45 
i considered all information provide*! ^ Plaintiff and reviewed only a 
portion of the untiiTu -. information provided by Defendant. Per the 
court's order, I considc i • only the information provided by Plaintiff [that 
included information lrom Bonnie to Craig] in compiling my final report. 
My findings to date accurately reflect the information provided by Plaintiff 
as well as certain independent research performed by o_r UIIICL 
Thaw tK K\»; "n formed that the Defendant had inferred, that in 
compliance with the court's Order that she provide all information to 
Norman/1 oebbeeke prior to the close of business w ' ' i i1-^er 29th 1998, 
that the J .—..*- iv.,* h.>,.» niqced in the IJS Mnil. 
A iiuna>ci wi da>s alter the court cutoff date, Norman-! oebbecke's 
receptionist reported that she had received docunients that had been hand 
delivered. The document !h.-t vere received consisted of several loose-
leaf binders equating to approximately six inches of dociiments. 
In addition to the report oi uie receptionist the binders includes no 
evidence of having been mailed and there was no evidence <*( w\ 
envelope, postage or mailing address o* am opw-r item indicating thai fhc 
documents had over been placed in the IJS Mail. 
Record, 472. 
1 / 
38. Trial was set to commence on August 16, 1999. Then Bonnie again 
requested that the trial court modify its previous discovery cut-off date order. The trial 
court held hearing on that request on July 12, 1999, just one month before trial, issuing 
an Order that,46 
1. Norman/Loebbecke Associates shall be permitted to consider all 
information currently in its possession and provided by the Defendant 
after the October 29, 1998, cut-off date. 
2. At her own sole cost and expense, Defendant, Bonnie Harris, shall 
provide any and all information she may wish to Norman/Loebbecke 
Associates, CPA's. All such information shall be provided to 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates to arrive at such offices absolutely no 
later than close of business on July 26, 1999, being fourteen (14) days, or 
two weeks, from the date of hearing hereon. Any information received by 
Norman/Loebbecke from Defendant after such date and time shall be 
excluded from trial and shall not be considered by Norman/Loebbecke in 
compiling its report in preparation for trial. 
3. Plaintiff, Craig Harris, may likewise provide any and all information 
he may wish to Norman/Loebbecke, CPA's. 
* * * 
5. Any and all expenses incurred as a result of this exceptional 
extension and consideration given to Defendant in order to assure her 
opportunity to be heard, shall be paid by the Defendant, the accounting of 
which shall be made at the time of trial. (Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
8. Any and all expenses incurred by Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
in considering the information currently in its possession and provided by 
the Defendant after the October 29, 1998, cut-off date shall be the sole 
responsibility of the Defendant. 
9. Any and all expenses incurred by Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
in adjusting its marital asset schedule as permitted by this Order shall be 
the sole responsibility of the Defendant. 
Record, 513. 
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u. i\iiy and all expenses incurred h\ the Defendant pursuant to this 
• er shall be deducted !:oi;< .my sh in <-i k- "Mnul .stall - • otherwise 
awarded to her by the COM* ••• agreed to b \ stipulation. 
Trial Proceedings: 
i , iu, continuing ihn^M/h August . , , 1999. 
At the commencement of'trial, the coi 11 t having been informed -\l: Hrnd Townsend, 
CPA, Norman/Loebbecke Associates had recently suffered a seve* 
back, the ecu 11 t cc ntini led the It: ial to Sqptnii iber 23 199* ) L 
40. VV hen "'trial reconvened one month later on September 23, 1999, Brad 
Townsend, CPA,, testified, providing the trial court his report as to real and personal 
property matters. . .. I ovi i lsei id's te sth noi iy constiti ites c i le 
Iiiiiiiiiii/ii and foi'h ' aces/9 plus his written report that the court admitted 
as Plaintiffs Exhibit l;Mi Plaintiffs Exhibit 251 and questions from Judge Harding.52 A 
copy of "Plaintiff s Exhibit 1" is included in the Addendum hereto. 
oout records of Bonnie's income, 
employment history and potential, Bonnie objected, 
Mr. Martin: [to M- Townsend] I notice n, mat availaoie sunu^ :nui diere's 
h nsled for her !IVM<P< ' -*v" empire mr"» < ** nothing 
Mr,.Moody: Your Honor, I'm goiny to object. I, we're . . . I think we're 
getting off track. 
Record, 532-534 - Minutes-Bench Trial. 
Record, 1297 - Transcript, pp 407-417. 
Record, 1280 - Transcript, pp 427-541 
Record — Plaintiffs "Exhibit 1," a copy of which is included in the Addendum. 
Record — Plaintiffs "Exhibit 2," a copy of which is included in the Addendum. 
Record, 1281 - Transcript, p 540. 
Record, 1281 - Transcript, pp 497 - 498. 
Mr. Martin: No. 
Mr. Moody: He's talking about income and I don't know that that's part of 
Mr. Townsend's obligation. His was to determine assets and 
schedules. And I don't know where Mr. Martin is going with 
this. I think it's (short inaudible, two speakers). 
Mr. Martin: Well, let me get right down to the, the basic question. 
Did Mrs. Harris ever tell you that she was too sick to work? 
Mr. Moody: I'm, I'm going to object to that question. I don't know that 
that's even relevant to - -
Mr. Martin: Just talking about admissions from Mrs. Harris that are contrary 
to the testimony that she's provided to the Court. 
The Judge: I have enough inconsistent testimony already on that point. I'll 
sustain the objection. [Emphasis added.] 
Mr. Martin: Understood. 
42. Analyzing the testimony, evidence and arguments, in discussion with 
counsel, Judge Harding issued a detailed ruling from the Bench.54 But at the close of 
trial on September 23, 1999, Bonnie's submitted argument to the court challenging Mr. 
Townsend's fees. Bonnie challenged the prior Order of the Court as to the 
Norman/Loebbecke fees that she had been Ordered to pay after the court's discovery 
cut-off date and the costs to be assessed to Bonnie as a result of the, 
Exceptional extension and consideration given to Defendant in order to 
assure her opportunity to be heard, shall be paid by the Defendant, the 
accounting of which shall be made at the time of trial."55 
43. As a consequence of Bonnie's challenge to the Norman/Loebbecke 
accounting fees, the complexities of this division and other matters, Judge Harding set 
the date of October 12, 1999 for additional evidence from Mr. Townsend,56 
The Judge: So I'm going to need to have him submit his expenses 
and provide me with those which he believes resulted 
54
 Record, 1281 - Transcript, pp 552-647, specifically "Court's Ruling," commencing at p 604. 
55
 Record, 509-513 - Order, paragraph 5. 
56
 Record, 1281 - Transcript, p 647. 
20 
from the extension to assure her an opportunity to, to be 
heard. 
^ ^hc October 12, 1999 session of the ti ial, the i e w as direct i u id : i c > • = 
examinatii m < if I i ii I < m i isei i i Ji i< Ig< I Ii ii ding al ,< > • iske< 1 : ;j >ec rifle : < questions of Mr. 
I ownsend as to the accounting and \ aluation.^ Concluding that session, Judge 
Harding i -ok -4 '-...iter in ider advisement, issuing the r~ur t \ wiittui ;\uiin<? ^ 
October 22, I9W. directing Bonnie s counsel lu |ik |h i • -•; '" • . 
t /mil, .mil Supplementary Decree of Divorce. 
45. Over objection, <JI_ \o\emlxM ?l), 1999,60 the trial owrl , \ecuted and filed 
the Supplementary Findings nfFact ( ^niu^ious *,•/ ,. t/u. , .,: l(/ , . :.\ •. . M I h't M I 
46. That Decree of Divorce stated in only one sentence that, ""Respondent is 
not v-ntitled to receive alimony from the Petitioner"61 
47 A i in ili, I in I ii mi i I I I II ii  in I in'i 11 ii / mduwi \ c/ 'ii nmsi IUI < 1 uiih nunc 
paragi aph.6" 
48. Bonnie's "Order" also erroneously included one and only one Exhibit. As 
to that Exhibit, Bonnie s Order stated tl lal/ 
rhe total net di\ isible value ui IIK L-M.IU M mc .line ihc Decree of 
Divorce was entered was $975,273.00 as stated ui ^Petitioner's Exhibit 12' 
57
 Record, 1282 - Transcript, pp 684-694. 
58
 Record, 1282 - Transcript, p 711. 
59
 Record, 591-596. 
60
 Record, 638. 
61
 Record, 635. 
62
 Record, 628. 
63
 Record, 624, paragraph 5. See also: Record, 633. 
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Schedule A. A copy of said Schedule A is attached hereto and by this 
reference incorporated herein. (Emphasis added.) 
49. According to Bonnie's Brief on Appeal, that particular single page 
"Exhibit" is titled "Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution—per Craig 
Harrris." Actually, "Plaintiffs Exhibit 1" at trial consisted of fourteen (14) pages. A 
copy of "Plaintiff s Exhibit 1" is included in the Addendum. 
50. Bonnie's claim in her Appellant's Brief, at page 21, also now claims that, 
In making his property distribution between Mr. and Mrs. Harris, the trial 
court simply accepted the determination of Norman/Loebbecke as to what 
constituted marital property between Mr. and Mrs. Harris. 
Norman/Loebbecke made this determination based on the desires of Mr. 
Harris (Record at page(s)(s) 624). Likewise, the trial court simply accepted 
Mr. Harris, assertions as to the value of the various items of property in 
making his property distribution. (Record at page(s) 624) 
51. On December 28, 1999, Craig filed a Rule 59/60 Motion for 
Reconsideration, with the trial court, seeking clarification as to division of certain 
property, adding that,64 
Since the trial the Respondent [Bonnie] has so interpreted the Decree, 
maneuvered the transfer of property, and failed to comply with 
requirements of the Court imposed upon herself so as to unlawfully 
transfer to herself a much greater cash dollar value than directed by the 
Court at trial. 
52. On December 29, 1999, Bonnie filed her Notice of Appeal.65 Part of 
Bonnie's argument on appeal was that the trial court had failed to meet the requirements 
as to consideration of alimony.66 
64
 Record, p 655, paragraph 9. 
65
 Record, 665. 
66
 Docketing Statement. 
22 
53. Also, on December 29, 1999, Craig filed his Notice of Appeal, stating 
that,67 
This Notice of Appeal is being filed to preserve Petitioner's right to 
appeal because at the present time Petitioner is uncertain about whether 
the Supplementary Decree of Divorce is a final order of the Court. 
Petitioner has filed a motion with the District Court addressing this issue. 
54. Pending ruling on Craig's Motion before the trial court, proceedings 
before the Court of Appeals also moved forward. 
55. On February 29,2000, Bonnie filed her own Rule 60 Motion before the trial 
so 
court, alleging certain discrepancies in the evidence received by the court at trial. 
56. On April 4, 2000, the direction of the case shifted back to the trial court 
when the trial judge granted Craig's Motion for Reconsideration.69 
57. Given the new Order in the trial court, the Court of Appeals referred the 
matter back to the trial court, placing certain specific requirements upon Bonnie. That 
Order dated April 18, 200070 was signed by Judge Billings, directing that, 
It is necessary that Mrs. Harris file an amended docketing 
statement within ten days of this order. 
Failure to file an amended docketing statement may result in the 
dismissal of the appeal. 
We expect that the amended docketing statement will include a 
date-stamped copy of an amended notice of appeal timely filed with the 
trial court and concerning the April 4, 2000, order, amended 
supplementary findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Failure to file a timely, amended notice of appeal with the trial court 
may leave us without jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the April 
2000 order. 
67
 Record, 663. 
68
 Record, 746-751. 
69
 Record, 773. 
70
 See Addendum. 
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58. The Court of Appeals also placed requirements upon Craig through its 
April 18, 2000 Order signed by Judge Billings that, 
If Mr. Harris wishes to appeal the April 2000 order, findings of fact, 
or conclusions of law, he should also file a timely, amended notice of 
appeal with the trial court. 
In order to avoid having his appeal dismissed, Mr. Harris must file a 
docketing statement within ten days of this order. 
59. By Order71 signed by Judge Davis on June 23, 2000, the time requirements 
were extended until after the trial court had ruled on Rule 59 and Rule 60(b) motions, 
The due date for cross-appellant's docketing statement is stayed 
pending a ruling of the trial court on cross-appellant's molions. However, 
in granting the extension of time, the court makes no representation 
concerning jurisdiction. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that cross-appellant shall file her docketing 
statement within 21 days after the trial court has ruled on the pending 
motions. 
60. On April 4, 2000, the trial court also issued Amended Supplementary 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
61. As to Bonnie's issue of alimony, the trial court's new orders dated April 4, 
2000 amended Findings as to alimony, stating: 
ALIMONY 
In considering whether the Respondent is entitled to alimony, the 
Court considered the financial condition and needs of the Respondent; 
the Respondent's earning capacity or ability to produce income; the 
ability of the Petitioner to provide support; and the length of the marriage. 
Having considered these factors in light of the evidence presented at trial, 




the Petitioner having duly considered the following factors as set forth 
below, weighing each factor as indicated: 
(a) The Financial Condition and Needs of the Recipient Spouse: The 
Court finds that the parties' respective standards of living at the 
time of marriage were both significantly enhanced during the 
marriage. Due consideration has been given to attempt to equalize 
the parties' respective standard of living. Viewing the facts most 
favorable to the Respondent; her premarital separate net assets 
were $78,804.00. Considering all factors, setoffs, and adjustments 
taken from the report of the CPA firm of Norman/Loebbecke 
Associates, Respondent is awarded assets with a net value of 
$441,761.50 in this matter. The substantial assets Respondent has 
received will contribute to and assist the Respondent with her 
ability to support herself. 
(b) The Recipient's Earning Capacity or Ability to Produce an Income: 
The parties were separated in August 1995 and the divorce was 
filed in September 1995. Before and during the marriage and 
through 1992, the Respondent was employed at Signetics, a semi-
conductor company in Quality Assurance/Quality Control. After 
her employment ended with Signetics, the Respondent attended 
college classes in business. The Respondent did not seek 
employment after her employment ended and stayed home to take 
care of a grandchild during which time she was receiving temporary 
support from the Petitioner. The Respondent testified that for the 
past several years, she had no physical or mental disability which 
prevented her from being gainfully employed. 
(c) The Ability of the Payor Spouse to Provide Support: The 
Petitioner's earning power is reflected in the valuation of the 
business. The value of that business is divided between the 
parties as reflected in the accounting report of Norman/Loebbecke 
Associates. 
(d)The Length of the Marriage: The parties were married for over 16 
years from the time of the marriage in 1992 until the parties divorce 
was final in January 1999. 
(e) Whether the Recipient Spouse Has Custody of Minor Children 
Requiring Support: No children have been born in the marriage and 
none are expected. 
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(f) Whether the Recipient Spouse Worked in the Business Owned or 
Operated by the Payor Spouse. During the marriage, the 
Respondent only worked for a short period of time at AID 
Equipment, Inc. 
(g) Whether the Recipient Spouse Directly Contributed in Any 
Increase in the Payor Spouse's Skill by Paying for Education 
Received by the Payor Spouse or Allowing the Payor Spouse to 
Attend School During the Marriage. The Respondent did not 
directly contribute to any increase in the Petitioner's skill's pay, or 
pay for his education. 
62. Subsequent to the above Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Bonnie has renewed her appeal. A copy of the trial court's April 4, 
2000 orders is included in the Addendum hereto. The matter of alimony having been 
clarified, Craig has no further interest in pursuing appeal of the trial court's Decree and 
has decided to stand on the trial court's most recent documents in that regard. 
63. Mr. Charles A. Schultz, Bonnie's first attorney, again represents Bonnie 
on this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. When Bonnie failed to assert a particular ground (violation of due process 
and equal protection) in the trial court, she may not raise that ground for the first time 
on appeal. 
2. The trial court is given broad discretion in domestic cases when 
considering the division of assets. The trial court's division of assets as expressed in 





When Bonnie failed to assert a particular ground (violation of due process and equal 
protection) in the trial court, she may not raise that ground for the first time on appeal. 
There is nothing in the Record or in Bonnie's Brief that indicates that she ever 
raised issues of violation of due process or equal protection before the trial court. 
Appeals courts have long maintained that to preserve an issue on appeal a party 
must first raise the issue before the trial court. Blair v. Axiom, 20 P.3d 388, 395 (Utah, 
2001), State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985). Failure to assert a violation of 
Constitutional rights before the trial court operates as a waiver of the right to challenge 
the admission of evidence for the first time before the Court of Appeals. See also: State 
v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 (Utah 1981); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Schwartz, 535 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d 
160 (2d Cir. 1975); State v. Kremer, 307 Minn. 309, 239 N.W.2d 476 (1976); Writt v. 
State, Tex. Grim., 541 S.W.2d 424 (1976); and United States v. Schwartz, 535 F.2d at 163. 
Given the facts of this particular matter and the trial court's deference and 
"exceptional extensions" for Bonnie's benefit, it would be difficult to imagine any valid 
argument that Bonnie was denied due process or an equal opportunity to present 
evidence at trial. 
Nevertheless, this paper will address that issue for fear that, by chance, this 
Court may determine that there is some possible evidence that a Constitutional 
challenge was somehow presented below. 
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Bonnie was not in any manner deprived of due process or equal protection. 
There is no question that Bonnie failed to cooperate in Discovery—She flaunted her 
ability to ignore discovery obligations imposed upon her by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, most specifically Rule 26. 
Rule 26, URCivP, "General Provisions Governing Discovery," the Advisory 
Committee Note for Discovery Rules 1999 Amendments, states that the purpose is, "To 
help ensure the case does not stall." 
This present case of Harris v. Harris on appeal herein is an example of an 
exceptional stall. Bonnie used every opportunity to delay and stall. She failed to 
respond to Discovery. She failed to respond to the trial court's Orders, treating the 
judicial system with contempt. She failed to provide any information within the 
discovery period(s). Even with all of that—the trial court set aside its own orders to 
accommodate Bonnie dalliances. 
Bonnie abused the Rules of Civil Procedure over and again, being forgiven at 
every step by the trial court's grant of additional time on a matter that was commenced 
more than five (5) years ago. Now Bonnie appeals to this Court, claiming that she was 
denied a fair trial, due process and equal protection. 
That is absurd. 
Bonnie simply ignored all Discovery requests until just weeks before trial, still 
asking for additional time and giving excuses. The kindest thing that can be said now is 
that the trial court was exceptionally compassionate. No sanctions were imposed 
against Bonnie even when ordered. 
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Rule 37(b)(2), URCivP, addresses sanctions that may be imposed against an 
uncooperative recalcitrant party. Under the Rules, within the bounds of Due Process 
and Equal Protection, Rule 37(b)(2)(C) permits the courts to issue, 
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding 
or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the 
disobedient party. 
When Bonnie failed to cooperate in Discovery, Craig brought the matter to the 
attention of the trial court on Motion for Order to Show Cause. Bonnie was Ordered to 
cooperate in discovery. Even then, after being Ordered by the Court to provide all 
information by a certain deadline date, Bonnie ignored the trial court's Order. 
The purposes of discovery rules are to make the fact-finding process as simple 
and efficient as possible. The purpose is elimination of any unnecessary technicalities, 
and to remove elements of surprise or trickery. The purpose is to enable the parties and 
the courts to determine the facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and as 
expeditiously as possible. Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39 (Utah 1967). 
But somehow the trial court permitted Bonnie to avoid sanctions, over and over 
again. She has no basis in fact or law to claim that the trial court's conduct in any way 
violated her due process or equal protection rights. That is absurd. It has no merit. Her 
argument is frivolous, being designed only to cause the greatest possible cost and 
injury to Craig. 
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POINT 2 
The trial court is given broad discretion in domestic cases when considering the 
division of assets. Consequently, Bonnie's remaining eight (8) allegations may be 
summarily disposed as follows: 
There is no merit to Bonnie's arguments as to questions of fact or law. There 
have been many domestic cases before the Court of Appeals. Cases have been widely 
cited, including Burt v. Burt, 709 P.2d 1166 (UT App. 1990), Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 
(UT Ct. App. 1993), and two are relatively new, Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 9 P.3d 171 (UT 
App 2000) and Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338 (UT 1999). 
Citing Young, the Kelley case held that, 
"We do not reverse a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous." Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, P15, 979 P.2d 338; accord Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co. 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 
1998). Further, to determine if the findings are against the clear weight of 
the evidence and thus clearly erroneous, we view the facts in the light 
most favorable to the findings. See State v. One 1984 Oldsmobile, 892 
P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1995), Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, P17, 994 
P.2d817. 
Apparently, much to Bonnie's chagrin, the trial court's last findings were filed on 
April 4, 2000. In error, Bonnie's Brief73 cites November 29, 1999 documents that were 
replaced by the April 4, 2000 documents. False reference to the November 29, 1999 
documents by the Record page numbers (pages 623-638) was not just a single typing or 
clerical error easily dismissed. 
Given the plethora of domestic case appeal decisions, the remaining seven (7) of 
Bonnie's allegations of trial court error will be briefly disposed of in 
numerical/sequential order as follows: 
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Bonnie's Allegation Number One (1): 
Bonnie alleges that the trial court erred "in failing to determine what property 
belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harris was marital property (Record 624)."74 
Attempting to support that claim, Bonnie refers to "Record, 624." Page 624 was 
attached to the first proposed order that had been prepared by Bonnie's counsel. That 
order was issued November 29, 1999 but was replaced by the trial court's findings and 
order on April 4, 2000. Bonnie's only reference in support of her claim remains the 1999 
void findings and order. 
Reference to that particular 1999 page (Record, 624) constitutes an intentional 
misrepresentation. Bonnie's claims are disingenuous. The reason for Craig's Rule 59 
Motion for clarification of the 1999 documents was that as they had been prepared by 
Bonnie's counsel for the trial court's signature they would be unquestionably 
overturned on appeal. As an example, the 1999 documents lacked any explanation as to 
the trial court's denial of alimony. By so doing, Bonnie and counsel set up a basis to 
appeal from their own proposed order that the trial court had signed, apparently without 
first reading the document. 
Craig filed his Rule 59 Motion with the trial court on that specific issue. 
As a result, some four months later, the trial judge issued a subsequent written 
Ruling15 on October 22, 1999 and Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and 
Bonnie's Brief, multiple references at pp: 7, 9, 12, 15, 16, 21, 24, and 35. 
Bonnie's Brief, p 6. 
Record, 596. 
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Conclusions of Law along with an appropriately modified Order Re: Motion for 
Reconsideration and Other Matters?1 on April 4, 2000, replacing the November 29, 
1999 documents now referenced in Bonnie's Brief. Copies of the replacement 
documents are included in the Addendum herewith. 
Bonnie's Allegation Number Two (2): 
Bonnie failed to raise any Constitutional question (due process or equal 
protection) before the trial court. Bonnie may not now raise such question for the first 
time on appeal. Claiming any objection of Constitutional proportions, Bonnie must 
recognize the "Preservation Rule." The Preservation Rule "applies to every claim, 
including constitutional questions." State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346 (Utah 2000). The 
Holgate case not only reaffirmed the Preservation Rule application to all matters of 
appeal but commented upon the purpose of that rule: 
As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal. See State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998). The 
preservation rule serves two important policies. First, "in the interest of 
orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to 
address a claimed error and, if appropriate correct it." State v. Eldredge, 
773 P.2d 29, 36. Second, a defendant should not be permitted to forego 
making an objection with the strategy of "enhancing the defendant's 
changes of acquittal and the, if that strategy fails, ... claiming on appeal 
that the Court should reverse." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 
1989). To serve these policies, we have held that the preservation rule 
applies to every claim, including constitutional question, unless the 
defendant can demonstrate that "exceptional circumstances" exist or 





Bonnie's Allegation Number Three (3): 
Bonnie alleges that the trial court erred, "by not including the twenty-percent 
equity interest in Aid Equipment, a marital asset, that Mr. Harris transferred to his 
sons."78 In support of that allegation, reference is only made to "Record at page (s) 
365-366.)"79 Under the trial court's Order, Bonnie was to report all questions she may 
have to the Court's appointed expert — the CPA firm of Norman/Loebbecke 
Associates. 
Bonnie's reference to Record page 366 is just the last page of an Affidavit of 
Brad Townsend, CPA. Why Bonnie would cite that particular Affidavit of Mr. 
Townsend remains unknown. What the Affidavit says is that Bonnie never complied 
with the trial court's Order that she provide her information to Mr. Townsend before a 
specific date, being October 29, 1998, specifically the last paragraph, states that,80 
As of the close of business on October 29, 1998, neither myself [Brad 
Townsend], nor the offices of Norman/Loebbecke Associates had received any 
information whatsoever from Bonnie Harris or her counsel regarding her position with 
respect to the assets of the marital estate. 
But even given a page reference error, the Record reflects that the trial court 
specifically considered the impact of Craig's transfer of a ten-percent (10%) in AID 
Equipment to each of his two sons, Troy and Scott. The trial court knew of that 
transfer. That transfer was considered in the valuation of the business. Bonnie's 
Bonnie's Brief, p 7. 
Bonnie's Brief, p 7, last line of last paragraph. 
Record, 366. 
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counsel specifically asked Mr. Townsend about it and the establishment of a company 
known as CST.81 
Bonnie's counsel also specifically cross-examined Craig on that issue.82 
Craig is uncertain but another reference could possibly be to pages 365-366 of 
the Transcript that is identified as No. 1279 of the trial court's Record. 
On page 365, line 14, reference is made to "CST," a new employee leasing 
company that had been started by Craig's sons, Troy and Scott. It was in 1995 that 
CST was established, AID Equipment Company was reorganized, and a ten percent 
(10%) interest in AID Equipment Company, Craig's business, was transferred to each of 
his only children, Troy and Scott. The Transcript of Proceedings at pages 366-367, 
reflect the following questions put to Craig by Bonnie's counsel: 
Q. Do you recall when you transferred 20% to them? 
A. I believe it was when the corporation papers were refiled in Nevada versus 
Utah because we had missed a corporation something or other and Mr. 
Martin advised me to form a new corporation in California, in Nevada in 
place of it. 
Q. And do you remember when that was? 
A. Approximately four years ago. 
Q. So it would be 1995? 
A. Approximately. 
Q. And did Scott or Troy pay you any money for the stock that you 
transferred to them? 
A. Not cash money. Just years of work. 
Q. Do you recall whether or not when you say 1995 whether it was before the 
separation or after the separation when you transferred the stock? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. And you reported that? That is reported on your K-l. Is that correct. 
A. Yes it is. 
Record, 1281 — Transcript, p 520, commencing at line 4. 
Record, 1279 — Transcript, p 365, commencing at line 24. 
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The record reflects that question to have been folly disclosed and considered by 
the trial court. 
Bonnie's Allegation Number Four (4): 
Bonnie claims reversible error because she was not awarded all costs and 
attorney fees. She objects to the trial court's Order that each party was to pay their 
own attorney fees and costs. Bonnie also appeals the trial court's order that she be 
required to pay one-half of the CPA fees and costs. 
Bonnie claims that the trial court committed reversible error when on February 23, 
1998 Judge Schofield issued the trial court's Order Re: the Accounting and 
Determination of Values. The fact is that Bonnie had specifically requested the Order 
that appointed the CPA firm of Norman/Loebbecke. Bonnie stipulated to that specific 
Order and its exact wording in writing. On January 20, 1998, Bonnie signed that 
Stipulation. That signature page is at page 270 of the Official Record. 
One is not entitled to appeal their own request and written stipulation. It is not 
reversible error for the trial court to enter a finding and order in compliance with 
Bonnie's own personal request for appointment of a CPA firm and that Craig pay all the 
costs from the business. 
After the trial, Bonnie again specifically challenged the CPA firm costs and the 
trial court held an additional hearing on October 12, 1999. At the end of that hearing, 
the trial court judge commented on the record:83 
Record, 1282, commencing at page 711, line 7. 
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The Judge: All right. Well I'm going to take the matter under 
advisement. I'll issue a written decision in regards to the 
attorney fees relating to the order [to] show cause, the 
attorney fees that each party submitted in regards to the 
overall proceedings and the award of those attorney fees, 
the Norman/Loebbecke costs related to the late compliance 
by Mrs. Harris, as well as the Norman/Loebbecke costs as 
between the parties other than that aspect And then the 
division, and most importantly then I guess is the division of 
this property in accordance with the Court's previous order. 
Once I've entered that I'll then order one of you to prepare 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree in 
conformance. And then if you've got motions to reconsider 
then your timing would be appropriate. 
Let's take these. We're dealing with complicated issues that 
it creates too big a mess to mix them. I want to do them 
systematically and one at a time in accordance with the rules. 
All right. Well, thank you both. And thank you [Mr. 
Townsend] for coming to testify as well. 
We'll be in recess. 
Bonnie's Allegation Number Five (5): 
Bonnie claims that the trial court committed reversible error by, "not awarding 
Mrs. Harris alimony after an eighteen-year marriage." 
The simple retort and response to Bonnie's fifth challenge is that the provisions 
of § 30-3-5, UCA, as cited in the Utah common law is that the length of marriage is only 
one item to be considered. See: § 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (as amended) and 
Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 179, and footnote 9. 
See also: Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999), 
We do not reverse a trial court's findings of fact unless Ihey are clearly 
erroneous. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 
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(Utah 1998). When challenging a trial court's findings, "an appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be "against the clear weight of the evidence," thus making them 
"clearly erroneous.'1 In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) 
(citation omitted). We review a trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness. See Smith v. Batchelor, 934 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 1997). 
However, Bonnie and counsel go much further. On page 35 of Bonnie's Brief is 
the claim that, 
The trial court indicated that it had considered the items specified in UCA 
§30-3-5(7), (Record at page (s) 630), however, it made no specific findings 
regarding its alleged consideration of those items. The trial court 
instructed J. Grant Moody [then Bonnie's attorney] to prepare appropriate 
findings with respect the (sic.) specified items the (sic.) court's 
consideration of the various items; however, the court did not articulate 
any findings from which Mr. Moody could prepare any specific findings 
and could only prepare Findings of Facts (sic.) and Conclusions of Law 
indicating that the trial court considered the items specified in UCA 30-3-
5(7). (Record at page (s) 630) 
Bonnie's claim on appeal is false. Again counsel in Bonnie's Brief has cited the 
trial court's first Findings that the trial court itself overturned when it issued its 
Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 4, 2000. 
See: Record, at pages 161-110. The April 4, 2000 trial court documents detailed its 
consideration as to Alimony in two full and complete pages, listing every paragraph 
required under §30-3-5(7)(a), giving the trial court's comments and reasons for each. 
Claiming otherwise is a costly deception and in violation of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct: Rule 3.1. "Meritorious Claims and Contentions." Rule 3.3. 
"Candor Toward the Tribunal" Rule 3.4. "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel" and 
Bonnie's Brief, page 35. 
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Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "Signing of Pleadings, motions, and Other 
Papers; Representations to Court; Sanctions." 
Bonnie's Allegation Number Six (6): 
Bonnie's Brief on appeal claims that the trial court committed reversible error in 
"Finding that Mrs. Harris' Mother's home, which Mrs. Harris was purchasing from her 
brother and sister was marital property." 
Such claim has no merit. The decision as to inclusion of Bonnie's interest in her 
deceased Mother's home in Provo and Bonnie's buy-out of her sibling's other two-
thirds interest from her brother and sister during the marriage is documented. Again, in 
support of Bonnie's claim she does nothing more than make a reference to one page of 
the Record, page 624. Reference to only that page is intentionally misleading. 
Attachment of page 624 to the trial court's initial findings of November 29, 1999 that 
was replaced by the trial court by findings entered on April 4, 2000 as explained above. 
In making the division of assets, the trial court also included real property and a 
business that had been built and owned by Craig prior to the marriage to Bonnie. In 
this case, the trial court had the advantage of an extensive CPA inventory, audit and 
report by the trial court's appointed and accepted expert witness.85 
The trial court considered the facts and balanced the equities after more than 
three days of hearing and considering the evidence. Finally, the trial judge spent 
considerable time discussing all facets of pre-marital assets, marital assets and the need 
to fairly divide the assets between the parties. 
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The trial courts comments, questions and consideration of the division of assets 
on the record alone constitute more than One Hundred (100) pages of the Transcript.86 
As another example, the court specifically considered but denied Craig's request 
for consideration of his separate pre-marital property and appreciated value of 
$216,849.66 to his personal assets during the three years of Bonnie's absence from the 
87 
marriage. 
In the final division of property by the trial court as reflected in its April 4, 2000 
findings, the value was divided by carefully considering all aspects of this exceptional 
association and marriage. The trial court gave Bonnie every opportunity to be heard 
and to present additional evidence long after discovery deadlines had expired. Having 
considered all the evidence, the trial court exercised its discretion in fully considering 
this exceptional and unusual marriage relationship. The court set valuation dates, 
giving Bonnie all consideration. 
It is always possible for a party to disagree with a trial court's division of assets. 
In this case, the parties have never agreed with each other on the division of assets. 
The discretion of the court on this exceptional relationship was required. 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah App. 1993), citing Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 
1166 (Utah App. 1990), held that, 
Trial courts must distribute property between the parties to a divorce 
in a fair, systematic fashion. See id. at 1172 & n.10. The Burt court 
85
 Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 & 2, copies of which are in the Addendum. 
86
 As an example, see Record, 1281, pp 552-653. 
87
 Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, page 7; See also: Bonnie's comments/admissions, i.e. Record 
1280—Transcript pp 91 linesl0-21. 
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noted that the trial court should "first properly categorize the parties' 
property as part of the marital estate or as the separate property of one or 
the other. Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her 
property and fifty percent of the marital property." Id at 1172. The Burt 
court continued: 
But rather than simply enter such a decree automatically, the court 
should then consider the existence of exceptional circumstances and, if 
any be shown, proceed to effect an equitable distribution in light of those 
circumstances. 
The trial court gave Bonnie every consideration, evea the possibility that 
Bonnie's multiple counsel and her failure to meet discovery requirements had possibly 
damaged her cause. The trial Judge specifically responded to that question on the 
record:88 
The Court: Well, and this argument came before me and I attempted to 
ameliorate any prejudice to your client by allowing it to be 
reopened, have her provide the information, and her pay for the 
additional costs that were associated with that, which she then did. 
So I'm troubled by your statement that somehow her position 
hasn't been presented property before the accountant or before the 
Court. 
Mr. Schultz: Well, Your Honor, if she has to pay for anything that she brings to 
th the accountant, subsequent to the October 30 -
The Court: It it's because she didn't comply with the Court's order and the 
accountant has to reopen his work to take it into account, and 
costs additional money, shouldn't that be assessed to her, as 
opposed to a split between the parties? 
Mr. Schultz: O, absolutely, Your Honor, and we're not - -
The Court: Well, that's what happened. 
Record, 1283 — Transcript, p. 117, lines 8-14. 
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Bonnie's Allegation Number Seven (7); 
Bonnie's Brief on appeal claims that the trial court committed reversible error in 
requiring that Bonnie "pay one-half of the Norman/Loebbecke fees associated with the 
divorce proceeding." 
In support of that claim, Bonnie merely cites "Record at page (s) 1283). Number 
1283, containing One Hundred and Twenty Four (124) pages, being a Transcript of 
Proceedings of a post-trial hearing held on February 13, 2001. 
Bonnie's "Amended Notice of Appeal" was filed by her present legal counsel, 
Mr. Schultz, on March 26, 2001, states nothing more than, 
COMES NOW, the Respondent, Bonnie Kay Harris, and hereby 
appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals from the Supplementary Decree of 
Divorce and the Supplementary Decree of Divorce Re: Respondent's Rule 
59 Motion entered in this matter. 
The Respondent filed a Cost Bond on Appeal with this Court on 
December 29,1999. 
The trial court filed its Supplementary Decree of Divorce on November 29, 1999. 
The trial court filed the Order on the Rule 59 Motion on April 4, 2000. The April 4, 2000 
documents provide that each party shall "bear their own attorney fees"90 and the 
Findings of Fact are quite explicit as to what the court considered in that regard.91 
The trial court's findings may not be reversed unless they are "clearly 
erroneous." Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999). 
Record, 1406. 
Record, 765, paragraph 11. 
Record, 763-764. 
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Bonnie's Brief on this subject constitutes nothing more than an argument over 
legal fees. The nature of Bonnie's Brief on this point constitutes no more than a repeat 
of an argument over facts and interpretation of facts. Bonnie's Brief fails to give any 
further insight, fails to include any legal citation and fails to marshal any evidence in 
support of that conclusion. 
Bonnie's Allegation Number Eight (8): 
Bonnie claims that the trial court committed reversible error in not including the 
value of "CST" company as marital property. 
Bonnie, Craig and the trial court's appointed expert witness all testified as to 
what constituted pre-marital and marital property. The trial court considered all of that 
evidence. 
Essentially, Bonnie's argument on this point is nothing more than attempting to 
say that when the trial court receives evidence from a court appointed expert the trial 
court is unlawfully shifting judicial authority to that appointed expert. 
In this particular matter, it must always be remembered that the CPA firm of 
Norman/Loebbecke as the court appointed expert was specifically requested by Bonnie. 
With exercise in considerable duplicity, Bonnie now claims that the trial court committed 
reversible error by accepting expert testimony that she herself requested. 
Even though Bonnie may disagree with the trial court's decision to believe Craig 
and the CPA on such matters, Bonnie's claim is nothing more than a challenge to the 
question of fact and whether or not the trial court is justified in believing Craig when he 
42 
testified that CST was an employee leasing company that had been set up by his two 
sons, Troy and Scott. 
09 
In Bonnie's Brief, a number of references are made to evidence related to CST 
as that matter was discussed on the record by various witnesses. Evidence from 
Bonnie's Brief supports that this specific matter was considered by the trial court and 
that the testimony of Craig that Craig had no interest in that company was accepted by 
the trial court. It is axiomatic that property in which the facts show that Craig had no 
interest cannot be marital property. 
The court received direct testimony from Scott Harris that he and Troy had 
independently set up the CST company stating that 100% interest in CST was held, 50% 
by Scott and 50% by Troy and that Craig had no interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Bonnie's appeal has no merit. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Craig J. Harris prays the, 
1. Affirmation of the trial court's April 4, 2000 Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree; 
2. Dismissal of Bonnie's appeal; and 
Bonnie's Brief, pp. 49-51. 
Record, 1279 - Transcript, 332. 
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3. Consideration of damages and recovery of attorney fees and costs as 
provided under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Rules of Civil 
Procedure and applicable Rules of Professional Conduct. 
ADDENDUM 
Attached. 
DATED: this ^ day of January 2002. 
LOREN D.MARTIN, PC 
Counsel for Appellee 
B 
7 
ren D. Martii 
'ttorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing APPELLEE BRIEF - RE: BONNIE'S APPEAL 
FROM THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED NOVEMBER 29, 1999 was lodged 
with the Court of Appeals and placed in the US Mail, postage prepaid on the 28th day of 
December, 2001 to Charles A. Schultz. Two copies of the bound version were also 
placed in the US Mail, postage prepaid on January 2, 2002 addressed both mailings were 
addressed as follows: 
Charles A. Schultz 
P.O. Box 756 






Norman/Loebbecke. CPA.'s, Report of Assets and Valuations 1-24 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 1-14 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 15-24 
Ruling—October 22, 1999 —(Record, 591-596) 25-30 
Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
November 22,1999 — (Record, 623-631) 31-39 
Supplementary Decree of Divorce 
November 22,1999 — (Record, 632-638) 40-46 
Notice of Entry of Order Granding Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 
April 4,2000 — (Record, 789-790) 4748 
Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration and Other Matters 
April 4,2000 — (Record, 785-788) 49-52 
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iORTNE^ B. RUESCH 
HR, 
NORMAN/LOEBBECKE ASSOCIATES 
Accounting, Valuation and Economic Loss Consultants 
September 22, 1999 
I i 9 t A M 5UU1H IfcMKLL 
SUITE 320 
SALT LAKE CITY 
UTAH 84111 
PHONE (801) 539-1600 
FAX (801) 539-1642 
Grant J. Moody 
Attorney at Law 
483 West 30 North 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Loren D. Martin 
Martin & Nelson 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
Re: Harris v. Harris Marital Asset Schedule 
Dear Sirs: 
Attached herewith are final valuation schedules illustrating our conclusions regarding the 
marital estate of Craig Harris and Bonnie Harris. I will be available by telephone this evening 
at either my office or home, 539-1600 or 486-8087 respectively, if you have any questions or 
desire to have us consider any further adjustments. 
It is a pleasure assisting you with this matter. Please call if there are any questions. 
Best Regards, 
Brad Townsend, CPA/ABV 
Schedule A, 
Harris v. Harris 
Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution 


































TaxEff / Net 
Subtot Comm Value Comments 
ash & Cask Equivalents 
BankOne 1250-0221 Checking 
Northwest Credit Union 7592 0 Savings 
Northwest Credit Union 7592 1 Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-30939 5 Personal Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-31378-5 Special Checking 
Itocks and Bonds 
InterWest Medical stock 
ietwement A ccounts 
Dean Witter 124-100296 IRA Standard 
Dean Witter 179 039509 IRA Standard 
Prudential Securities OUQ-R68840-41 Simple IRA 
Signetics Retirement (present value of expected future payments) 
ife Insurance 
MONY Whole Life 1347-24-19W 









House and Lot located at 692 S Juniper S t , Pleasant Grove, UT Joint 
Commercial Bldg and House located at 172 W 9400 S , Sandy, UT Craig 
House and Lot located at 1328 N Locust Lane, Provo, UT Bonnie 
Building and Lot located at 725 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT Joint 
Vacant Lot located at 721 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT Joint 
Vernal UT - 10 Acres Uintah County Property Craig 
\usm esses 
AID Equipment Company, Inc (80%) 
'ehtcies 
1994 Ford Taurus GL 
1983 26* Komfort 5th Wheel Trailer 
1978 26' Sea Ray Motor Boat 
Jet Ski - 1985 Kawasaki(per CH, does not own) 


































Bonnie 1/31/99 M 25 
Craig 1/31/99 M MSL 































































































Claimed as pre-marital by Mr Hams 
Some ponton earned pre-mamagc 
Mr Hiims pie-mant.il equity = $40,000 
May not be possible to subdivide for sale 
Claimed as sole & separate by Mrs I lams 
Deed to property not recorded 
Estimated value of $30 000 in 1982 
12,213 12,213 12,213 
Schedule A 
Harris v. Harris 
Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution 
as of 1/26/99 
Description Poss. Date 
Cost/ 
Market Ref. Value Debt Subtot. 
Estim. 
Tax Eff./ Net 
Comm. Value Comments 
'urniture/J-urnish ings/. 1 ppliart ces 
Furniture and Personal Property 
Jewelry 
Furniture and Personal Property 
)ther Assets 
Gun Safe and Guns (per CH-given away to children per court order) 
Gun reloading equipment 
















































Mrs. Harris claims $1,950 in pre-marital assets. 
NOTES: 
1. Credit card debt has not been included pursuant to the Courts 10/29/97 order. 
Schedule A1 
Harris v. Harris 
Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution 






















































ash A Cash Equivalents 
BankOne 1250-0221 Checking 
Northwest Credit Union 7592 0 Savings 
Northwest Credit Union 7592 1 Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-30939-5 Personal Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-31378-5 Special Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-31378-5 Savings 
tocks and llonds 
Beacon Financial/lnterWest Medical stock 
earement, I ccounts 
Dean Witter 179-039508 IRA Standard 
Dean Witter 179 039509 IRA Standard 
Signetics Retirement (present value of expected future payments) 
ife Insurance 
MONY Whole Life 1347-24-19W 








House and Lot located at 692 S Juniper St , Pleasant Grove, UT Joint 
Commercial BIdg and House located at 172 W 9400 S , Sandy. UT Craig 
House and Lot located at 1328 N Locust Lane, Provo, UT Bonnie 
Building and Lot located at 725 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, U Joint 
vacant Lot iocated at 721 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT Joint 
Vernal, UT - 10 Acres, Uintah County Property Craig 
\uune\ses 
AID Equipment Company, Inc (100%) 
eh telex 
1994 Ford Taurus GL 
1983 26' Komfort 5th Wheel Trailer 
1978 26' Sea Ray Motor Boat 
Jet Ski - 1985 Kawasaki(per CH, does not own) 

































































































































Claimed as pie-marital by Mr. Harris 
Some portion earned pre-mamage 
Mr Hams pie-mantal equity = $40,000 
May not be possible to subdivide for sale 
Claimed as sole & separate by Mrs Hams 
Deed to pioputy not reioided 
Estimated value of $30,000 m 1982 
19.622 10.022 9,600 9.600 
Schedule A1 
Harris v. Harris 
Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution 
as of 8/9/95 
Description Poss. Date 
Cost/ 
Market Ref. Value Debt Subtot. 
Estim. 
Tax Eff./ Net 
Comm. Value Comments 
1
 urniture/Furnishings/Applian ces 
Furniture and Personal Property 
Jewelry 
Furniture and Personal Property 
')(her Assets 
Gun Safe and Guns (per CH-given away to children per court order) 
Gun reloading equipment 
Oebtj and Liabilities 
Discover 6011009384509944 
First Card 5286308693382369 
First USA 4417112157275639 






























































Mrs. Harris claims $1,950 in pre-marital assels. 
50,000 50,000 50,000 
Grand Total $ 1,071,016 $252,423 $ 818.593 $168,940 $649,652 
Schedule B 
Harris v Harris 




Trade Accounts Receivable 
Accounts Receivable - Employees 
Inventories 
Total Current Assets 
Office Equipment 
Accumulated Depreciation - Office Equipment 
Operating Equipment 
Accumulated Depreciation - Operating Equipment 
Vehicles 
Accumulated Depreciation - Vehicles 
Total Fixed Assets 
TOTAL ASSETS 
LIABILITIES & EQUITY 
Accounts Payable - Trade 
Taxes Payable 
Income Tax Liability on Adjustments 
Long-Term Liabilities - BankOne LOC 
Total Liabilities 
Capital Stock 
Paid in or Capital surplus 
Retained earnings 
Total Equity 





































































ESTIMATE OF VALUE 
Adjusted Net Equity of 100% Interest 
Multiplied by Craig Harris Interest at 80% 





(A) - Adjust office equipment for tax depreciation in excess of estimated economic depreciation 
(B) - Adjust operating equipment for estimate of equipment on hand which was expensed in prior years 
(C) - Adjust operating equipment for tax depreciation in excess of estimated economic depreciation 
(D) - Adjust vehicles for tax depreciation in excess of estimated economic depreciation 
(E) - Accrue liability for estimated taxes incurred in realization of increased asset values 
(F) - Net adjustment to equity for adjustment of assets to fair value 
Schedule C 
Harris v. Harris 





















1999 Ford Truck F250 





















































































































1. These capital items are included in the appraisal of real property owned by Craig J. Harris. 
Schedule D 
Harris v Harris 




t Gain/(Loss) on Asset Dispositions 
erest Income 
ntal Income from Sublease 
her lncome/(loss) 
Total Revenue 
T O F GOODS SOLD 
)SS PROFIT 
ENSES 
>mpensation of officers 
lanes and wages 
pairs 





nsion Profit sharing etc 
nployee benefit programs 
her deductions 
Utilities 
Travel Expense (T&E 1986 and prior) 
Insurance & Bonding 
Legal and Professional Fees 
Commissions 
Janitorial Expense 
Meals and Entertainment Less 20% or 5 0 % 
OutsWe Services 
Seminars and Conventions 
Temporary Labor 
Credit Card Discount 
Small Tools 
License 
Dues & Subscriptions 
Office Expense 









































































































































































































































































































































































































> Adjustment for low compensation levels to Craig Harris 
) - Adjustment for excess of tax depreciation over economic depreciation 
) Adjustment for legal fees related to dto>rce and non-recurring business litigation 
Schedule E 
Hams v Hams 













































TOTAL $ 168,909 $174,477 10 $474,661 
CAPITALIZATION OF EARNINGS 
Weighted Average Earnings 
Projected Normalized Earnings 
Divide by Capitalization Rate 
Indicated Total Minority/Marketable Value 
Plus Control Premium at 36 81 % 
Indicated Control/Marketable Value 
Less Marketability Discount at 31 93% 
Less Discount for Key Person at 15% 










Indicated Value of 100% interest 
Multiplied by Craig Hams Interest at 80% 




CAPITALIZATION OF CASH FLOW 
Projected Normalized Earnings 
Plus Expected Non-Cash Expenses 
Less Expected Working Capital Increase 
Less Expected Capital Expenditures 
Expected Cash Flow(A) 
Divide by Capitalization Rate 
Indicated Total Minority/Marketable Value 
Plus Control Premium at 36 8 1 % 
Indicated Control/Marketable Value 
Less Marketability Discount at 31 93% 
Less Discount for Key Person at 15% 
Indicated Control Non-Marketable Value 
Indicated Value of 100% Interest 
Multiplied by Craig Harris Interest at 80% 

















(A) - Assumed that long-term borrowings and debt repayment 
net to zero on average as has occurred in the recent past 
Schedule F 
Harris v. Harris 




Average Equity Premium 
Average Small Stock Risk Premium 
Specific Company Risk Premium 
Composite Discount Rate 
Less: Expected Earnings Growth Rate 









Harris v. Harris 
SELLER'S DISCRETIONARY CASH FLOW METHOD OF VALUATION 
AID Equipment 
MATERIAL HANDLING COMPARABLES 
Weighted Average Adjusted Earnings $47,466 
Plus: 
Average Adjusted Compensation and Perquisites to Owner 38,594 
Average Adjusted Depreciation & Amortization 3,481 
Seller's Discretionary Cash Flow 
Multiplied by: Market Transaction Multiple - Material Handling 
Indicated Value of Earnings Stream (w/o inventory) 
Plus: Inventory 
Indicated Control Non-Marketable Value 
Indicated Value of 100% Interest 
Multiplied by: Craig Harris Interest at 80% 











Harris v. Harris 
SUMMARY OF VALUATION ESTIMATES 
AID Equipment 
Adjusted Book Value 
Income Approach Values 
Capitalization of Income 
Capitalization of Cash Flow 
Market Transaction Values 















TOTAL 100% $147,533 
Schedule I 
Harris v. Harris 












































Bonnie VISA First USA 
Transfer Bonnie acct for payoff 
U.S. District Clerk 
U.S. District Clerk 
Property tax 
Bonnie 
Farmers - boat, house Provo 
Bonnie 





ARC Bonnie med. 
Central Utah Medical Bonnie 
Farmers house ins. 
Bonnie settlement money 




































1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Year 
Net Value 1982 Craig Harris 
Prepared on September 22, 1999 
By counsel for Mr. Harris 
NET WORTH—Estimated—1992 (Claimed value brought to the marriage) 
Home 40,000.00 
Business 
(Range = 70K to 120K) 











Personal Property (collections, etc.) 5,000.00 
Personal Effects (clothing, etc.) Not valued 
Estimated Net Worth (Range) $ 191,800.00 
—to: $241,800.00 
PLEASE NOTE: For purpose of calculations the figure of $ 241,800.00 will be used 
as a base for calculation of increase and decrease in valuation during marriage. Use 
of the $191,800.00 would require an appropriate adjustment. 
Bonnie Harris Net Value 1982 
Prepared on September 22, 1999 
By counsel for Mr. Harris 
NET WORTH—Estimated—1992 (Claimed value brought to the marriage) 
Cash Settlement from prior marriage $ 65,000.00 
Misc. Household items & Furniture— value not estimated. 
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HARRIS v. HARRIS 
Case Number 95-44-02034 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Option 1 
Value to January 26, 1999. 
Norman/Loebbecke calculation of Net Value as of 1/26/99 (Date Divorce Decree Filed) 
Note that Divorce Decree was ordered to be effective October 19. 1998. 
Net Value, 1/26/99 $ 973,202.00 
If the Court then divides equally, 1/2 each 
Craig retains $486,601.00 
Bonnie receives $ 486,601.00 
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HARRIS v. HARRIS 
Case Number 95-44-02034 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Option 2 
Appreciated Value from 1982 to January 26, 1999. 
Note that Divorce Decree was ordered to be effective October 19, 1998. 
Each person credited with Net Value at the time of the marriage. 
Net Value. 1/26/99 $ 973,202.00 
Minus: 
Craig Harris claims $ 241,800.00 
Bonnie Harris claims $ 65,000.00 
Net Distributable Value $ 666,402.00 
Craig Harris 
Net Value at Marriage $ 241,800.00 
Bonnie Harris 
Net Value at Marriage $ 65,000.00 
If Court divides Net Distributable Value equally, 1/2 each 
Craig retains $333,201.00 
B onnie receives $ 3 3 3,201.00 
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HARRIS v. HARRIS 
Case Number 95-44-02034 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Option 3 
Value to August 9, 1995. 
Norman/Loebbecke calculation of Net Value as of August 9. 1995. 
Net Value, 8/9/99 $676,127.00 
If court then divides equally, 1/2 each 
Craig retains $ 335,635.00 
Bonnie receives $ 335,635.00 
:> 
HARRIS v. HARRIS 
Case Number 95-44-02034 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Option 4 
Value to August 9, 1995.-
Each person credited with Net Value at the time of the marriage. 
Net Value. 8/9/95 $ 676,127.00 
Minus: 
Craig Harris claims $ 241,800.00 
Bonnie Harris claims $ 65,000.00 
Net Distributable Value $ 369,327.00 
Craig Harris 
Net Value at Marriage $ 241,800.00 
Bonnie Harris 
Net Value at Marriage $ 65,000.00 
If Court divides Net Distributable Value equally, 1/2 each 
Craig retains $184,663.50 
Bonnie receives $184,663.50 
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HARRIS v. HARRIS 
Case Number 95-44-02034 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Option 5 
Adjustment for Bonnie leaving Marriage for years 1986-1990 
Value to January 26, 1999. 
Note that Divorce Decree was ordered to be effective October 19, 1998. 
Note: It is calculated that of the present value of the business the amount of thirty 
eight percent (38%) growth was experienced in the when Bonnie was absent 
I during the years of 1986-1990. See "AID Equipment Sales Over Time." 
Adjustment for Years (1986-1990) Bonnie left the marriage: 
Adjustment to Business Value (145,461 x .38 = 55,275.18) 
Resulting Devaluation of Estate Net Value $ 55,275.18 
Adjustment to Building Value (425,196 x .38 = 263,621.52) 
Resulting Devaluation of Estate Net Value $ 161,574.48 
Reduction Amount $ 216,849.66 
Norman/Loebbecke calculation of Net Value as of 1/26/99 (Date Divorce Decree filed) 
Norman/Loebbecke Calculated Net Value, 1/26/99 $ 973,202.00 
Reduction Amount $ 216,849.66 
Resulting Adjustment to Net Value $ 756352.34 
Craig Harris claims $ 241,800.00 
Bonnie Harris claims $ 65,000.00 
Net Distributable Value $ 449,552.34 
If the Court then divides equally, 1/2 each 
Craig retains $ 224,776.17 
Bonnie receives $ 224,776.17 
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HARRIS v. HARRIS 
Case Number 95-44-02034 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Option 6 
Adjustment for Bonnie leaving Marriage for years 1986-1990 
Value to August 9, 1995. 
Note: It is calculated that of the present value of the business the amount of thirty 
eight percent (38%) growth was experienced in the when Bonnie was absent 
during the years of 1986-1990. See "AID Equipment Sales Over Time." 
Adjustment for Years (1986-1990) Bonnie left the marriage: 
Adjustment to Business Value (105,471 x .38 = 40,078.98) 
Resulting Devaluation of Estate Net Value $ 65,392.02 
Adjustment to Building Value (262,608 x .38 = 99,791.04) 
Resulting Devaluation of Estate Net Value $ 162,816.96 
Reduction Amount $ 228,208.98 
Norman/Loebbecke calculation of Net Value as of 1/26/99 (Date Divorce Decree filed) 
Norman/Loebbecke Calculated Net Value, 1/26/99 $ 649,652.00 
Reduction Amount $ 228,208.98 
Resulting Adjustment to Net Value $421.443.02 
Craig Harris claims $ 241,800.00 
Bonnie Harris claims $ 65,000.00 
Net Distributable Value $ 114,643.02 
If the Court then divides equally, 1/2 each 
Craig retains $57,321.51 
Bonnie receives $ 57,321.51 
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HARRIS v. HARRIS 
Case Number 95-44-02034 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS 
Property to Bonnie: 





Value to Bonnie 
The Provo House 
Value to Bonnie 
Signetics Retirement Fund 
Value to Bonnie 
1994 Ford Taurus 
Value to Bonnie 
Value to Bonnie 










Value to Bonnie $ 188,227.00 
NOTES: 
1. Should the Court order cash amounts to Bonnie it is requested that such indebtedness be 
reflected in a note payable from Craig to Bonnie. It is also requested that the note be at 
nine percent (9%) interest per annum payable in monthly installments over a period of 
five (5) years with the first payment due on October 1, 1999. 
2. Should the Court grant Bonnie an amount in excess of that listed above it is requested 
that Craig be permitted to buy all household furniture from Bonnie at the amount she has 
valued such items. 
3. Should the Court order an immediate cash payment to Bonnie it is requested that Craig be 
given time to cash in his life insurance policy. It is estimated that the interpolated 
terminal reserve value of the life insurance policy would be $ 16,042.00. 
4. Should the Court order additional transfers to Bonnie and require cash payment it is 
requested that the Court grant a reasonable time for Craig to obtain a loan on the house. 
5. Craig has previously been granted attorney fees of $5,711.48 (Vlarch 1999) — Execution 
of Judgment was stayed pending final order. 
6. Final distribution decision must be adjusted to reflect attorney fees and costs. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






•"> "XT -f*r^^A < H ^ T 1 ^ / ^ f f » » / / ) / >«•>' "ij**^ / I 
Case No (^54402513 ^SHHOTPZ^f 
Judge Ray M Harding, Jr 
This matter came on regularly for trial on August 16, 17 and September 23, 1999 
Petitioner (Craig Harris) was present in person and was represented by Loren D Martin of Martin 
& Nelson Respondent (Bonnie Harris) was also present in person and was represented by J 
Grant Moody Following closing arguments on September 23 the Court made several rulings 
from the bench, including ruling on the valuation of the marital estate However, the Court 
reserved ruling on the issues of the division of property, the Normal Loebbecke fees, and 
attorney's fees until October 12, 1999, to allow the parties to present proposals for the division of 
property and further argument on the fee issues 
The Court has now heard and considered the parties' proposals regarding property 
division and also considered all of the evidence adduced both verbally and through documents 
offered and received at trial In ruling on these remaining issues the Court has carefully 
considered and weighed the evidence relating to (1) the amount and kind of property to be 
divided, (2) whether the property was acquired before or during the marriage, (3) the source of 
the property, (4) the health of the parties, (5) the parties' standard of living, (6) the parties' 
respective financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity, (7) the duration of the marriage, (8) 
the children of the marriage; (9) the parties' ages at the time of the marriage and of divorce; (10) 
what the parties gave up because of the marriage, and (11) the necessary relationship the property 
division has with the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded. Therefore, having 
carefully reviewed the evidence and the record in light of the above factors, and being fully 
advised in the premises, the Court now makes the following: 
RULING 
Property Division 
On September 23, 1999, the Court ruled the Petitioner's premarital assets were 
$141,800.00 and that Respondent's premarital assets were $96,500.00. In a document entitled 
"Calculation of Division of Value per Bonnie Harris" submitted at the October 12, 1999 hearing, 
Respondent acknowledged certain reductions in her premarital assets $14,602 00 for a post-
separation credit card debt paid by the marital estate, and $3,094 00 for draws on the line of 
credit for Respondent prior to January 26, 1999, thus reducing Respondent's premarital assets to 
a total of $78,804 00 
The Court ruled that the total divisible value of the estate was $974,274.00 as stated in 
Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates However, included in this total 
value is Respondent's Signetics retirement account listed with a value of $28,754 00 The Court 
ruled that the Signetics retirement account should be divided according lo the formula stated in 
Woodward v Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), and that the parties could enter a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order on the account if they so desired Therefore, subtracting out the value 
of the Signetics retirement leaves a total divisible value of $946,519 00 After subtracting 
Petitioner's premarital assets of $141,800 00 and Respondent's premarital assets of $78,804 00 
Ruling Page 2 
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 • :<h- -'if-vec* t- enual division is $725,915.00. Dividing this value by two results 
in <J net marital value distributable to each party of $362,957,50 
I lu inl,,l Lir Jisitihuiiil li ' I 'np ' n It" I • $ W ()V7 ^o p), | ) ( T premarital assets of 
g, , o,«04.00 for a total of $44 1,761 SO The total value distributable to Petitioner is $362,957,50 
plus his premarital asset> *.; •• 14 i,SUu till foi a tuiuil at SVUf, /' ' mil 
\fUir consiliums the pnrtK":1 proposals for property division the Court finds ih.-' the 
parties' marital property is most equitably divided by awarding Petitioner the business. AID 
equipment Con ipatn iiiiii iinu ilin1 L ninim in i.ii iiiiiiili HI I ,1ml lui ,il i 1 1 ',\' / '•! ~: m 
Sandy, Utah where the business is located The * alue of Hie business JS $147.5 S3 00. and The 
value of the commercial building and KM ^ s4_ • ,., .io; ^ * JUI.^IK ,IA\ ,:• ed 
|nnpi t\\ H itli ,t tniiil 'i itliK un>V7° 7°o oo Hcspondent is awarded all remaining assets of the 
marital estate listed in Schedule A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke 
Associates, w.i.. . . ^s^p i : 
Woodward Therefore, Respondent is awarded property with a total value of $373,790.00,, 
Because the total value distributable to Respondent is $441,761.50, Respoi idei it is entitled to a 
ci ecii.1 < >f $67,971 5 D. 
Attorney's Fees 
I he I unit liiiiis that each paitv sin ild In ill Ilium HI iltomtT s fees in lllnv m/iiii i \* ilh 
the exception of the Court's Ordei dated Januan "(• l (^v \ou>re;n -CCOUM awarded Petitions 
a reasonable attorney's fee for bringing the <KK».-<. ^ wider. v...v,v* .
 au;>c i aitioner's 
iM'Hinr»(;l filed an affidavit on leview of 
eoi nisei's affidavit the Court finds that manv <>i the entries vu-ie n« »t i iaied to the Order to Show 
Cause but were for work done pi.,
 4.i. _ . 
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that only $2,564.16 of the fees set forth in counsel's affidavit were related to the Order to Show 
Cause. Therefore, the Court awards Petitioner $2,564.16 in attorney's fees for the October 19, 
1998 Order to Show Cause pursuant to its January 26, 1999 Order. 
Norman Loebbecke Fees 
Norman Loebbecke Associates' fees in this case total $22,443.17. The Court finds that 
Respondent should bear $1,744.00 of this total as her sole and separate obligation as required by 
the Court's Order of July 22, 1999 in which the Court allowed Respondent an extension to submit 
information to Norman Loebbecke Associates. The Court finds that bolh parties should equally 
bear the remaining fees of $20,699.17, such that each party is required to pay $10,349.58. 
Therefore, Respondent is to pay $12,093.59 of the Norman Loebbecke fees and Petitioner is to 
pay $10,349.58. 
Whereas Petitioner has already paid the majority of the Norman Loebbecke fees, the Court 
finds that Petitioner is responsible to pay the entire $22,443.17 owing, and the Court will offset 
Respondent's obligation of $12,093.59 against her credit for the property division. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, Respondent is awarded a credit of $67,971.50, offset by an award of 
$2,564.16 to Respondent for attorney's fees and $12,093.59 for her share of the Norman 
Loebbecke fees for a total credit of $53,313.75. Therefore, 
1. Respondent is awarded JUDGMENT against the Petitioner in the amount of 
$53,313.75. 
2. Execution on the judgment is stayed for sixty days following the entry of an Order on 
this Ruling to allow Petitioner time to secure funds to pay the judgment. 
Ruling Page 4 
\ 1 it mi IK '\, lii mi lln Respondent shall prepare an Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and a Decree consistent with the terms of this Ruling, and the other Rulings and Oi dei s of 
ihc Court and su< - .- *ion to the 
Court for signature, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah ' "I< >' njdicial Administration. 
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MARTIN & NELSON 
P.O. Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0590 
J. Grant Moody 
336 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
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336 West Main Street 
American Fork, U T 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-4181 
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Attorney for Defendant 
IM r i i r mi lPTH II iniriAI DISTRICT COURT OF ITAH COUNTY 
\ IE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, ) SUPPLEMENTARY FINDIM i> 
) f >F FAC' ' \ N D CONCIXJSI< *v 
I 'etitioi ler ) * i ! * ' \ 
BONNIE HARRIS ) 
' ) f isil Nn ' l) :>44tOb4DA 
Respo i tdn t l ) Judge; R;n Harding, Jr. 
I his matter came on regularly foi trial on t "Vugi ist 16, 1 ) ' and Septembei 23 , 1999 
with a final h c a n n - v i m ; held on October 12, 1999. Petitioner, C r a ^ 1 larris, was present and 
was represented by Loren D. Mart in of Mart in & Nelson Respondent , Bonnie I larris, was also 
(iiesciil A\U\ was it pieseiik d I I" ' il I I I ml I \ m ii I IHHI 1" I 1 n l l u m n y \ inMiig 
arguments on September ?1 19W iht- < ouri made several ruliniis i h m the bench, including 
m.i;n^ on ihe valuaue,,. , llK n.a.;;4u cs tak . «K t ^urt reserved .un..^: ;>n the issues of the 
d'\ i* of property; the Norman Loebbecke fees, and at torney 's fees until the October 12, 1999 
hearing date to al low the parties to present proposals for the division of property and further 
Jigiiiti"!. nt « »i ilie lee iss .« 
I , . . . i he parties previously were granted a Decree of Divorce by the Court entered on January 
26, 1999. The Court heard the evidence presented by the parties both verbally and through 
documents offered and received at trial including each parties proposed property division 
presented to the Court. In ruling on the remaining issues, the Court carefully considered and 
weighed the evidence relating to: (1) the amount and kind of property to be divided; (2) whether 
the property was acquired before or during the marriage; (3) the source of the property; (4) the 
health of the parties; (5) the parties' standard of living; (6) the parties' respective financial 
conditions, needs and earning capacity; (7) the duration of the marriage; (8) the children of the 
marriage; (9) the parties' ages at the time of the marriage and of the divorce; (10) what the parties 
gave up because of the marriage; and (11) the necessary relationship the property division has 
with the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded. Therefore, having carefully 
reviewed the evidence and the record in light of the above factors, and being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court now makes the following Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in this matter: 
SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT 
Property Division 
1. At the time of the parties marriage, the Petitioner's premarital assets were $141,800.00 
and that Respondent's premarital assets were $96,500.00. 
2. The Court finds that it is fair and equitable and finds that the property should be 
valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered being January 26, 1999. 
3. In a document entitled "Calculation of Division of Value per Bonnie Harris" 
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(Wfiiiinlal assets: 
a. $14,602.00 for a post-separation credit card debt paid by the marital estate; and 
1999. 
^ ic Respondent's premarital assets are thus reduced to a total of $78,804.00. 
il I ii liH.il m I nlh iMilili NMIMI ui lip i si Hill .it tin Iniir ui thf I livriv 
0f Divorce was $975,273.00 as stated in Petitioner's Exhibit i Schedule A, prepared by Norman 
Loebbecke Associates. A copy of said Schedule A is auuun.t* ;iciuo ..*<ki by this reference 
incorporated herein,. 
•> included in this total value is Respondent's Signeti.es retirement account listed with a 
f o r m u l a stated in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). The parties should enter 
Vied Domestic Relations Order on the account if they so desire. 
of $946,519.00. Subtracting Petitioner's premarital assets of $ 141,800.00 and Respondent's 
premarital assets of 3>/X,XlM.UU liuiii (lit" net marital asset value subject to cqii.il di\r.mn i:, illius 
$725,915.00. Dividing this value by two results in a net marital asset value distributable to each 
party of $362,957.50. The total value distributable to Petitioner is $362,957.50 plus his 
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Respondent is $362,957.50 plus her premarital assets of $78,804.00 for a total of $441,761.50. 
8. After considering the parties' property proposals, the Court finds that the parties 
marital property is most equitably divided by awarding Petitioner the business, AID Equipment 
Company, Inc., and the Commercial building, house and lot located at 172 West 9400 South in 
Sandy, Utah where the business is located. The value of the business is $147,533.00, and the 
value of the commercial building and lot is $425,196.00. Therefore, Petitioner is awarded 
property with a total value of $572,729.00. 
9. The Respondent should be awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in 
Schedule A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the 
exception of the Signetics retirement which is to be divided pursuant to Woodward as set forth 
above. Therefore, Respondent should be awarded property with a total value of $373,790.00. 
Because the total value distributable to Respondent is $441,761.50, Respondent should be 
entitled to a credit of $67,971.50. 
ALIMONY 
10. In considering whether the Respondent is entitled to alimony, the Court considered 
the financial condition and needs of the Respondent; the Respondent's earning capacity or ability 
to produce income; the ability of the Petitioner to provide support; and the length of the marriage. 
Having considered these factors in light of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that the 
Respondent is not entitled to receive alimony from the Petitioner. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
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I I I IK 1 I ml IlliiiiJs dial en h | >.'ii 1 \ should hi ai 111« n MI iitlniruVs (t'cs in tin1. malli i 
with the exception of the Court's Order dated January 26. 1 C>W u herein the (ourt awarded 
Petitioner a reasonable attorney's fee for bringing the Ociolx. »*'. .*• •>. ; >ido ^ MN - * .iJ.se. 
12 ' I he Petitioner 's coi u ise 1 file d anaffi :la v it of attoi ney's fees totaling $5,711,48. 
^r^A review of counsel's affidavit the court; finds that many of the entries were not related to the 
Order to Show Cause but were for work done prior to drafting and preparing foi the Oi de it lie • 
r.liuw I \tiisc I he < \ nirl finds lli.tl niiiy $? 564.16 of the fees set forth in c o u n s e l ' s affidavit were 
d to the Order to Show Cause and the ( ourt awards Pet i t ioner $2 ,564 .16 in a t to rney ' s fees 
for the • AiwJKi ; " M u , : i 
NORMAN LOI rtUhlKLiLhi> 
1" Norman Loebbecke Associates" lees in this case total $22,443 H 
separate obligation as required b\ the Court's Order of Juh .'2. lv>9^ m which the Court aiU-wed 
D
^°^Midciit an extension to submit inloiinaik>;i ^ n . 'u^ , . wtM v^:.^  , ^ut .aies, 
15 Ilic Coi ul: finds that both parties should equally bear the remaining fees of 
$20,699.17, such that each party is required to pay $10,349.58. The Respondent is therefore 
1
" •"" * to pa.) $12,093 59 of tl le 1 lot i i lai 11 oebbecke fees and Petitioner is reqi lired t : pa^  * 
$1U,.>49.58. 
16 The Peti t ioner has aireadv paid tiie maioniv r-i ,...* , \ i . i , .,*;, Lwcr.;vekc j ^ . - . . ...e 
( "oiii I: J inds that tl le Petitioi lei is responsible to pay the entire $22,44 j . l 7 owing, and the 
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Petitioner is entitled to an offset of Respondent's obligation of $12,093.59 against her credit for 
the property division. 
17. As set forth above, Respondent is awarded a credit of $67,971.50, offset by an award 
of $2,564.16 to Petitioner for attorney's fees and $12,093.59 for her share of the Norman 
Loebbecke fees. The total credit for Respondent is $53,313.75. 
18. Each party should be ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and 
delivering the necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and 
personal property division as ordered by the Court. 
19. The Court finds that it is proper that execution of the judgment against the Petitioner 
should be stayed sixty (60) days after the entry of the Order to allow the Petitioner time to secure 
funds to pay the judgment. 
The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each party is awarded the property both personal and real as set forth in the above 
Findings of Fact. 
2. No alimony is awarded in this case. 
3. Except as set forth in the above Findings of Fact, each party shall pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
4. Except as set forth in the above Findings of Fact, the parties shall share equally in the 
costs for Norman/Loebbecke. 
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$53,313.75. 
6. Execution on the judgement is stayed for sixty days following the entry of an Order on 
(his Ruling hi ill i IVliliiiiirr liniK1 I'm in iin1 1'imil1 In pi1, lln |inlj.inn ill 
] j. * >:inp!emental Decree of Divorce shall be entered accordingly. 
DATED ihis/AAm of November. 1999. 
^ M - ' F / / v 
>ved as to Form: 
%$%&/ 
%&«_:•?:££&* 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Harris v, Harris 
Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution 





Value Bonnie Craig 
Cash & Cash Equivalents 
BankOne 1250-0221 Checking 
Northwest Credit Union 7592.0 Savings 
Northwest Credit Union 7592.1 Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-30939-5 Personal Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-31378-5 Special Checking 
Stocks and Bonds 
InterWest Medical stock 
Retirement A ccounts 
Dean Witter 124-100296 IRA Standard 
Dean Witter 179 039509 IRA Standard 
Prudential Securities OUQ-R68840-41 Simple IRA 
Signetics Retirement 
Life Insurance 
MONY Whole Life 1347-24-19W 
New York life 42594539 Term Life 
Land/Residence 
House and Lot located at 692 S. Juniper St., Pleasant Grove, UTB 
Building and Lot located at 725 E. Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT 
Vacant Lot located at 721 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT 
Vernal, UT -10 Acres, Uintah County Property 
Businesses 
AID Equipment Company, Inc. 
Vehicles 
1994 Ford Taurus GL 
1983 26* Komfort 5th Wheel Trailer 
1978 26' Sea Ray Motor Boat 
Furniture/Furnishings/AppUances 
Furniture and Personal Property-Craig 
Jewelry 
Furniture and Personal Property - Bonnie 
Other Assets 
Gun reloading equipment 










































































Debts and Liabilities 
500 - 500;: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 




 om the date c f ser vice to file an objection the foregoing Supplemen j 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law which on -his Q *la\ of November. 1999, a trae X 1 I 1 W 1 1 
and correct copy was mailed, postage prepa.o.,«. ;ii. it,,i.<-.. ;ng: 
Loren 1). Martin 
P.O.Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, l ! T 8 " 1 1 1 
J. Grant Moody, P.C. Bar No. 6282 
336 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-4181 
Facsimile: (801)756-3940 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
BONNIE HARRIS ; 
Respondent. ] 
) SUPPLEMENTARY 
> DECREE OF DIVORCE 
> Civil No. 954402034DA 
> Judge: Ray Harding. Jr. 
This matter came on regularly for trial on August 16, 17 amd September 23, 1999 
with a final hearing being held on October 12, 1999. Petitioner, Craig Harris, was present and 
was represented by Loren D. Martin of Martin & Nelson. Respondent. Bonnie Harris, was also 
present and was represented by J. Grant Moody of J. Grant Moody, P.C. Following closing 
arguments on September 23. 1999 the Court made several rulings from the bench, including 
ruling on the valuation of the marital estate. The Court reserved ruling on the issues of the 
division of property, the Norman Loebbecke fees, and attorney's fees until the October 12, 1999 
hearing date to allow the parties to present proposals for the division of propem and further 
argument on the fee issues. The Court subsequent} issued a written ruling dated October 22. 
1999. The parties previously were granted a Decree of Divorce by the Court entered on Januarv 
JUDGMENT 
26, 1999. I he Com t heard the e\ idence presented b) the pat ties both v ei ball) and thi c 1 igh 
dc ei iments offered and received at trial including each parties proposed property division 
presented to the Court. The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
anil (In ('uurl h.i\ \\\y n \ icwt il llit n kieiiit" ami lln ira mil .ill I hrini» ftilh M\\ isnl IN III 
premises, now enters the following: 
SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE 
\ the time of the parties marriage, the Petitioner's premarital assets were $141,,800,00 




 ' . alued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered being 
' .;. *r\ 2(\ 19W 
( altit fiufr. Iihill In ..iiilnliiin (cii fin nil In Rt |H»!iik'iiI • |uvmjfil»il • nscl1 
a. $14,602.00 for a post-separation credit card debt paid by the marital estate; 
b. $3,094 00 for draws on the line of credit for Respondent pi *»* u> January 26, 
1999 
•1 The Respondent's premarital assets are reduced to a total of $78,804,00, 
was $975,273.00 as stated in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Schedule A. A copy of said Schedule A 
is attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein. 
tl lis total' - alii ic is 1 1 espoi idei it's Signetic s i etii ei iierit ace oi int. listed \ >.< ith a 
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value of $28,754.00. The Signetics retirement account is to be divided according to the formula 
stated in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). The parlies shall enter a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order on the account if they so desire. 
7. Subtracting the value of the Signetics retirement leaves a total divisible net asset value 
of $946,519.00. Subtracting Petitioner's premarital assets of $141,800.00 and Respondent's 
premarital assets of $78,804.00 from the net marital asset value subject to equal division is thus 
$725,915.00. Dividing this value by two results in a net marital asset value distributable to each 
party of $362,957.50. The total value distributable to Petitioner is $362,957.50 plus his 
premarital assets of $141,800.00 for a total of $504,757.50. The total asset value distributable to 
Respondent is $362,957.50 plus her premarital assets of $78,804.00 for a total of $441,761.50. 
8. After considering the parties' property proposals, the Court awards Petitioner the 
business, AID Equipment Company, Inc., and the Commercial building, house and lot located at 
172 West 9400 South in Sandy, Utah where the business is located. The value of the business is 
$147,533.00, and the value of the commercial building and lot is $425,196.00. Therefore, 
Petitioner is awarded property with a total value of $572,729.00. 
9. The Respondent is awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule 
A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the exception of the 
Signetics retirement which is to be divided under Woodward as set forth above. Therefore, 
Respondent is awarded property with a total value of $373 J90.00. Because the total value 
distributable to Respondent is $441,761.50, Respondent is entitled to a credit of $67,971.50. 
ALIMONY 
3 
10 I 'he Respondent is not ciiuiicd <o K\X.VC alimony from the Petitioner. 
i 1 1 ORNEY'SFEES 
11 Each party should hear their own attorney's fees in this matter, with the exception of 
,u, v ..UM s Order dated January 26, 1/999. \ \< herein It i.e Cc \ it t aw arded I 'etitionei areasoi lable 
attorney's fee for brini-hr the October 19, 1998, Order to Show Cause. 
"Hie Petitioner s counsel Hied an affidav it of attorney's fees totaling $5.711 48, 
•i .^
 t < ' '-• * - " msel' s 
affida\ n vvcre related to the ()rde? n> Show ("ausr nnd thr ('ourt thuv iwardb the Petitioner 
W.5M o n attorneys iee> loi WIL i KU>\K\ • < >UK \ .* •i»*-w ause pursuant to its 
NORMAN LOEBBECKE FEES 
13 I forman I oebbecke Associates'" fees in this case mai >_. n 
14. Respondent is ordered to bear $1,744.00 of this total as her sole and separate 
~** >n -.s required by the Court's Order of July 22, 1999 in which the Court allowed 
Respondent an extensioi I to si lbn lit infon i latioi I t :: • 1 1 :)i n lai I I c ebbecke Associates. 
i 5 The Court orders that both parties shall equally bear the remaining fees of 
$2i)96( t: ' i i , such that each party is required to pay $10,349.58 I he I ;i* espondent is required to 
pay $12,093.59 of the Norman Loebbecke fees and Petitioner is required tr p:-- $10,349.58. 
16. The Petitioner has already paid the majority of the Norman I oebbecke fees, the 
Petitioner is entitled to an offset of Respondent's obligation of $12,093.59 against her credit for 
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the property division. 
17. The Respondent is awarded a credit of $67,971.50, offset by an award of $2,564.16 
to Petitioner for attorney's fees and offset by $12,093.59 for her share of the Norman Loebbecke 
fees. The total credit for Respondent is $53,313.75. 
18. Each party is ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and delivering the 
necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real properly and personal property 
division as ordered by the Court. 
19. The Court orders that execution of the judgment against the Petitioner be stayed sixty 
(60) days after the entry of this Order to allow the Petitioner time to secure funds to pay the 
judgment. 
DATED t h i s ^ ay of November, 1999. 
* / • , 
Approved as to Form: 
istrict Court Jtf |ie\ *"** j?&'4 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
5 
l l an i ^ \ . Harris 
Pioposul Muiliil Asset and Liahlit 
per Craig Harris 
H i ti il ul i f i i 
Description 
Lash & Cash Equivalents 
BankOne 1250-0221 Checking 
Northwest Credit Union 7592.0 Savings 
Northwest Credit Union 7592.1 Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-30939-5 Personal Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-31378-5 Special Ch 
Stocks and Bonds 
In t i iVi 
Retirement Accounts 
Dean Witter 124-100296 IRA Standard 
Dean Witter 179 039509 IRA Standard 
Prudential Securities OUQ-R68840-41 Simple IRA 
Signetics Retirement* 
Life Insurance 
MONY Whole life 1347-24-19W 
New f ' f f <0594539T-
Land/Residence 
House and Lot located at 692 S Juniper St., Pleasant Grove, UTB 
Commercial Bldg. and House located at 172 W. 9400 & , S a n ^ ' I i t 
House and Lot located at 1328 N. Locust Lane, Provo, Ul 
Building and Lot located at 725 E Orchard Drive, Pleasar 11 f 
Vacant Lot located at 721 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grot 
Vernal, UT -10 Acres, Uintah County Property 
Businesses 
AID Equipment Company, Inc. 
Vehicles 
1994 Ford Taurus GL 
1983 26' Komfort 5th Wheel Trailer 
1978 26' Sea Ray Motor Boat 
Fumiture/Fumishings/Appllances 
Furniture and Persons! Pi \ H? ^ I I'IJ 
Jewelry 
Furniture and Personal Property - Bonnie 
Other Assets 
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Bonnie Craig 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Petitioner has five 
(5) days from the date of service to file an objection to the foregoing Supplementary 
Decree of Divorce which on this 6 day of November, 1999, a true 
and correct copy was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Loren D. Martin 
P.O. Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
MLfcU 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF \nAH^JL^li2t^± 
-^^Deputy 





NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 
GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. •9G4402513 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
This Notice relates to this Court's granting of a Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider following 
the filing of a notice of appeal. On November 29, 1999, the Court executed Supplementary 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Supplementary Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
On December 28, 1999, Petitioner Mr. Craig Jack Harris, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
pursuant to Rule 60(b). Then, on December 29, 1999 both Petitioner and Respondent filed 
Notices of Appeal. 
The Court heard Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on March 1, 2000, and granted 
the Motion as set forth in its Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration and Other Matters executed 
April 4, 2000. In its Order, the Court directed the parties to submit Amended Supplementary 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law. The Court executed these Amended Supplementary 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 4, 2000. 
Therefore, pursuant to White v. State. 795 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 1990), the Court hereby 
gives notice that it granted Petitioner's Rule 60(b) Motion for Reconsideration on April 4, 2000. 
Copies of the Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration and Other Matters, and the Amended 
Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached to this Notice. 
DATED this J "liajfof April, 2000. . 
(YM. H A R D I N G ^ . ' JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Entry of 
Order Granting Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration with postage prepaid thereon this T 
day of April, 2000, to the following: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230 
Re: Appellate Case No. 20000037-CA 
J. Grant Moody 
336 W. Main St. 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Loren D. Martin 
P.O. Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0590 
Christopher D. Ballard 
LawjOerk 
riLtu 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
J. Grant Moody, (6282) 
J. GRANT MOODY, P.C. 
336 West Main St. 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-4181 
Facsimile: (801) 756-3940 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, : ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND OTHER 
Plaintiff, : MATTERS 
BONNIE HARRIS, : Civil No. 954402034 DA 
Defendant. : Judge: Ray Harding, Jr. 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on March 1, 2000 on Petitioner's Motion 
for Reconsideration and Other Related Matters and the Petitioner Craig Harris was present and 
represented by Loren D. Martin, of Martin & Nelson, P.C. and the Respondent Bonnie Harris 
was present and represented by J. Grant Moody, of J. Grant Moody, P.C, and the parties having 
reached a partial stipulation as recited to the Court and the Court, having reviewed the pleadings 
and heard argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the 
following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is granted as set forth herein. 
2. The parties have agreed that the Respondent shall have until March 15,2000 to select 
V - ^ - ^ H J O Deputy 
and remove what personal property she desires to have from the building located on the Pleasant 
Grove lot. The Petitioner shall remove the remaining personal property he desires out of the 
building on or before March 30,2000. Any personal property left in the building after March 30, 
2000 shall be the property of the Respondent. The Petitioner shall pay $5,000.00 to the 
Respondent on or before April 4,2000, for the personal property located in his personal 
possession and from the personal property received from the building located on the Pleasant 
Grove lot. The Respondent shall provide access to the building at the lot to the Petitioner from 
March 16, through March 30,2000 upon the Petitioner giving Respondent 24 hour notice of the 
times in which he intends on removing the property. 
3. The parties have agreed and are ordered to submit Amended Supplementary Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to reflect specific findings made by the Court at trial with 
respect to Alimony and Attorney's Fees. Said Amended Supplementary Findings are to be 
prepared by the Respondent's Attorney within 10 days from the date of this hearing. 
4. The Court clarifies it decision made at trial regarding the temporary support and debt 
service payments made by the Petitioner to the Respondent after the Decree of Divorce was 
entered and prior to trial and the entry of the Supplementary Findings and Supplementary Decree 
in this matter. The Spousal support and debt service payments made by the Petitioner to the 
Respondent after the Decree of Divorce was entered and made prior to trial were duly considered 
at trial by the Court in its decision to terminate alimony and in not awarding Respondent any 
attorney's fees, Norman/Loebbecke fees or other costs. 
5. The Petitioner is permitted to pay the amount of $28,016.00, representing the amount 
2 
owing on the Bank One line of credit Account # 4262 0264 0104 2999 secured by the Pleasant 
Grove Residence, and subtract said sum of $28,016.00 from the amount the Petitioner owes to 
the Respondent of $53,313.75 as set forth in the Supplementary Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 
DATED this / day o£KlatG&, 2000. 
Approved as to Form: 
:OURT 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
j 
I hereby certify that on the A ^ d a y of March, 2000, I faxed and mailed a copy by US 
Postal Service, postage prepaid, the foregoing Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration and Other 
Related Matters to: 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
P.O. Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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J. Grant Moody, P.C. Bar No. 6282 
336 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-4181 
Facsimile: (801)756-3940 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
BONNIE HARRIS ] 
Respondent. ) 
) AMENDED SUPPLEMENTARY 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Civil No. 954402034DA 
i Judge: Ray Harding, Jr. 
This matter came on regularly for trial on August 16,17 and September 23,1999 
with a final hearing being held on October 12, 1999. Petitioner, Craig Harris, was present and 
was represented by Loren D. Martin of Martin & Nelson. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was also 
present and was represented by J. Grant Moody of J. Grant Moody, P.C. Following closing 
arguments on September 23, 1999 the Court made several rulings from the bench, including 
ruling on the valuation of the marital estate. The Court reserved ruling on the issues of the 
division of property, the Norman Loebbecke fees, and attorney's fees until the October 12,1999 
hearing date to allow the parties to present proposals for the division of property and further 
argument on the fee issues. The Court subsequently issued a written ruling dated October 22, 
1999. The parties previously were granted a Decree of Divorce by the Court entered on January 
P - u R L E D 
Deputy 
26,1999. The Court heard the evidence presented by the parties both verbally and through 
documents offered and received at trial including each parties proposed property division 
presented to the Court. In ruling on the remaining issues, the Court carefully considered and 
weighed the evidence relating to: (1) the amount and kind of property to be divided; (2) whether 
the property was acquired before or during the marriage; (3) the source of the property; (4) the 
health of the parties; (5) the parties' standard of living; (6) the parties' respective financial 
conditions, needs and earning capacity; (7) the duration of the marriage; (8) the children of the 
marriage; (9) the parties' ages at the time of the marriage and of the divorce; (10) what the parties 
gave up because of the marriage; and (11) the necessary relationship the property division has 
with the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded. Therefore., having carefully 
reviewed the evidence and the record in light of the above factors, and being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court now makes the following Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in this matter: 
SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT 
Property Division 
1. At the time of the parties marriage, the Petitioner's premarital assets were $141,800.00 
and that Respondent's premarital assets were $96,500.00. 
2. The Court finds that it is fair and equitable and finds that the property should be 
valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered being January 26,1999. 
3. In a document entitled "Calculation of Division of Value per Bonnie Harris" 
i 
submitted at the October 12,1999 hearing, Respondent acknowledged certain reductions in her 
premarital assets: 
a. $14,602.00 for a post-separation credit card debt paid by the marital estate; and 
b. $3,094.00 for draws on the line of credit for Respondent prior to January 26, 
1999. 
4. The Respondent's premarital assets are thus reduced to a total of $78,804.00. 
5. The Court finds that the total net divisible value of the estate at the time of the Decree 
of Divorce was $975,273.00 as stated in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Schedule A, prepared by Norman 
Loebbecke Associates. A copy of said Schedule A is attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein. 
6. Included in this total value is Respondent's Signetics retirement account listed with a 
value of $28,754.00. The Signetics retirement account should be divided according to the 
formula stated in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). The parties should enter 
a Qualified Domestic Relations Order on the account if they so desire. 
7. Subtracting the value of the Signetics retirement leaves a total divisible net asset value 
of $946,519.00. Subtracting Petitioner's premarital assets of $141,800.00 and Respondent's 
premarital assets of $78,804.00 from the net marital asset value subject to equal division is thus 
$725,915.00. Dividing this value by two results in a net marital asset value distributable to each 
party of $362,957.50. The total value distributable to Petitioner is $362,957.50 plus his 
premarital assets of $141,800.00 for a total of $504,757.50. The total asset value distributable to 
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Respondent is $362,957.50 plus her premarital assets of $78,804.00 for a total of $441,761.50. 
8. After considering the parties' property proposals, the Court finds that the parties 
marital property is most equitably divided by awarding Petitioner the business, AID Equipment 
Company, Inc., and the Commercial building, house and lot located at 172 West 9400 South in 
Sandy, Utah where the business is located. The value of the business is $147,533.00, and the 
value of the commercial building and lot is $425,196.00. Therefore, Petitioner is awarded 
property with a total value of $572,729.00. 
9. The Respondent should be awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in 
Schedule A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the 
exception of the Signetics retirement which is to be divided pursuant to Woodward as set forth 
above. Therefore, Respondent should be awarded property with a total value of $373,790.00. 
Because the total value distributable to Respondent is $441,761.50, Respondent should be 
entitled to a credit of $67,971.50. 
ALIMONY 
10. In considering whether the Respondent is entitled to alimony, the Court considered 
the financial condition and needs of the Respondent; the Respondent's earning capacity or ability 
to produce income; the ability of the Petitioner to provide support; and the length of the marriage. 
Having considered these factors in light of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that the 
Respondent is not entitled to receive alimony from the Petitioner having duly considered the 
following factors as set forth below, weighing each factor as indicated: 
4 
(a) The Financial Condition and Needs of the Recipient Spouse: The Court finds 
that the parties' respective standards of living at the time of marriage were both significantly 
enhanced during the marriage. Due consideration has been given to attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standard of living. Viewing the facts most favorable to the Respondent; her 
premarital separate net assets were $78,804.00. Considering all factors, setoffs, and adjustments 
taken from the report of the CPA firm of Norman/Loebbecke Associates, Respondent is awarded 
assets with a net value of $441,761.50 in this matter. The substantial assets Respondent has 
received will contribute to and assist the Respondent with her ability to support herself. 
(b) The Recipient's Earning Capacity or Ability to Produce Income. The parties 
were separated in August 1995 and the divorce was filed in September 1995. Before and during 
the marriage and through 1992, the Respondent was employed at Signetics, a semi-conductor 
company in Quality Assurance/Quality Control. After her employment ended with Signetics, the 
Respondent attended college classes in business. The Respondent did not seek employment after 
her employment ended and stayed home to take care of a grandchild during which time she was 
receiving temporary support from the Petitioner. The Respondent testified that for the past 
several years, she had no physical or mental disability which prevented her from being gainfully 
employed. 
(c) The Ability of the Payor Spouse to Provide Support. The Petitioner's earning 
power is reflected in the valuation of the business. The value of that business is divided between 
the parties as reflected in the accounting report of Norman/Loebbecke Associates. 
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(d) The Length of the Marriage. The parties were married for over 16 years from 
the time of the marriage in 1992 until the parties divorce was final in January 1999. 
(e) Whether the Recipient Spouse Has Custody of Minor Children Requiring 
Support. No Children have been born in the marriage and none are expected. 
(f) Whether the Recipient Spouse Worked in the Business Owned or Operated 
by the Payor Spouse. During the marriage, the Respondent only worked for a short period of 
time at AID Equipment, Inc. 
(g) Whether the Recipient Spouse Directly Contributed to Anv Increase in the 
Payor Spouse's Skill by Paying for Education Received by the Payor Spouse or Allowing the 
Payor Spouse to Attend School During the Marriage. The Respondent did not directly contribute 
to any increase in the Petitioner's skills pay or pay for his education. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
11. The Court finds that each party should bear their own attorney's fees in this matter, 
with the exception of the Court's Order dated January 26,1999, wherein the Court awarded 
Petitioner a reasonable attorney's fee for bringing the October 19,1998. Order to Show Cause. 
12. The Petitioner's counsel filed an affidavit of attorney's fees totaling $5,711.48. 
Upon review of counsel's affidavit the court finds that many of the entries were not related to the 
Order to Show Cause but were for work done prior to drafting and preparing for the Order to 
Show Cause. The Court finds that only $2,564.16 of the fees set forth in counsel's affidavit were 
related to the Order to Show Cause and the Court awards Petitioner $2,564.16 in attorney's fees 
6 
for the October 19,1999 Order to Show Cause pursuant to its January 26,1999 Order. 
NORMAN LOEBBECKE FEES 
13. Norman Loebbecke Associates' fees in this case total $22,443.17. 
14. The Court finds that Respondent should bear $1,744.00 of this total as her sole and 
separate obligation as required by the Court's Order of July 22,1999 in which the Court allowed 
Respondent an extension to submit information to Norman Loebbecke Associates. 
15. The Court finds that both parties should equally bear the remaining fees of 
$20,699.17, such that each party is required to pay $10,349.58. The Respondent is therefore 
required to pay $12,093.59 of the Norman Loebbecke fees and Petitioner is required to pay 
$10,349.58. 
16. The Petitioner has already paid the majority of the Norman Loebbecke fees, the 
Court finds that the Petitioner is responsible to pay the entire $22,443.17 owing, and the 
Petitioner is entitled to an offset of Respondent's obligation of $12,093.59 against her credit for 
the property division. 
17. As set forth above, Respondent is awarded a credit of $67,971.50, offset by an award 
of $2,564.16 to Petitioner for attorney's fees and $12,093.59 for her share of the Norman 
Loebbecke fees. The total credit for Respondent is $53,313.75. 
18. Each party should be ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and 
delivering the necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and 
personal property division as ordered by the Court. 
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19. The Court finds that it is proper that execution of the judgment against the Petitioner 
should be stayed sixty (60) days after the entry of the Order to allow the Petitioner time to secure 
funds to pay the judgment. 
The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each party is awarded the property both personal and real as set forth in the above 
Findings of Fact. 
2. No alimony is awarded in this case. 
3. Except as set forth in the above Findings of Fact, each party shall pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
4. Except as set forth in the above Findings of Fact, the parties shall share equally in the 
costs for Norman/Loebbecke. 
5. The Respondent is awarded JUDGMENT against the Petitioner in the amount of 
$53,313.75. 
6. Execution on the judgement is stayed for sixty days following the entry of an Order on 
this Ruling to allow Petitioner time to secure funds to pay the judgment 
7. A Supplemental Decree of Divorce shall be entered accordingly. 
8 
DATED this J 7 _ day of , 2000. 
OURT: 
M. HARDING. 
District Court Judi 
Approved as to Form: 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on t h e y ^ day of March, 2000, I faxed and mailed a copy by US 
Postal Service, postage prepaid, the foregoing Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to: 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
P.O. Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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